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Parents Involved, School Assignment 
Plans, and the Equal Protection Clause 
THE CASE FOR SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
Preston C. Green, III, Julie F. Mead, and Joseph O. Oluwole† 
INTRODUCTION 
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1,1 the Supreme Court examined whether 
two race-conscious student assignment plans violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.2 In each plan, race was a significant 
factor in determining whether children were eligible to attend 
oversubscribed schools.3 In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer 
argued that a permissive standard of strict scrutiny was 
applicable because legal precedent permitted school districts to 
use race-conscious approaches.4 Five Justices rejected Justice 
Breyer’s argument and held that traditional strict scrutiny was 
applicable, in large part because they believed that the Equal 
Protection Clause precluded the application of less demanding 
strict scrutiny to racial classifications.5 Justice Clarence 
Thomas went so far as to say that the Constitution was “color-
blind.”6 Likewise, the Justices argued that the racial 
classifications could promote feelings of racial inferiority and 
increase racial hostility.7 Justice Anthony Kennedy was 
concerned that the dissent’s version of strict scrutiny could 
expand the acceptance of racial classifications far beyond the 
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 1 551 U.S. 701 (2007) [hereinafter Parents Involved]. 
 2 Id. at 709-10.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. at 832 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 5 Id. at 746 (plurality opinion); id. at 792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 6 Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 7 Id. at 746 (plurality opinion); id. at 773 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 795 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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educational context and lead to a nationwide implementation of 
race-based governmental measures.8  
The majority’s refusal to apply a contextualized 
standard of strict scrutiny in Parents Involved needs to be 
examined. Notwithstanding the Court’s famous declaration in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District9 
that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”10 the 
Court has lowered the constitutional standard for public 
schools in matters involving free speech,11 search and seizure,12 
and due process.13 In these contexts, the Court altered the 
applicable constitutional rules because it recognized that school 
districts’ fundamental need to operate a safe and orderly 
learning environment outweighed its otherwise dogmatic 
adherence to strict scrutiny principles. Conversely, the Court 
has rejected arguments to adopt special constitutional rules in 
the educational context for cases in which school districts’ 
curriculums threatened to violate the Establishment Clause.14 
Ultimately, the Court determined that the text of the 
Constitution15 and the Founding Fathers’ specific intent to 
protect citizens’ freedom of conscience from the potentially 
coercive pressures of governmental religious establishment 
mandated a broad application of the Establishment Clause, 
particularly in school settings, where students were inherently 
susceptible to coercion.16  
In this article, we argue that the Court’s collective 
jurisprudential analyses of students’ constitutional challenges 
to public school actions justify a more nuanced application of 
strict scrutiny—an application that accounts for the special 
context of public school education when applied to the race-
  
 8 Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 9 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  
 10 Id. at 506. 
 11 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408-10 (2007); Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  
 12 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
836-37 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995); New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985). 
 13 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1975). 
 14 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307-09 (2000); 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590-92 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963). 
 15 Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.  
 16 Id. at 591-92.  
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conscious student assignment plans at issue in Parents 
Involved. Part I of this article provides an overview of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved. It closely 
examines the debate between Justice Breyer and the Justices 
constituting the majority over whether a less stringent 
standard of strict scrutiny should have been applied to race-
conscious school assignment plans. Specifically, we discuss 
Justice Breyer’s argument that a nonfatal version of strict 
scrutiny should apply because the policy was designed to bring 
the races together rather than to keep them apart.17 We also 
examine the majority’s counterargument that the Equal 
Protection Clause is color-blind, and that race-conscious 
student assignment plans promote notions of racial inferiority 
and increase racial conflict.18  
In Part II, this article examines several cases in which 
the Court has consistently held that the constitutional rights of 
students pursuant to the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments are not necessarily coextensive with the rights of 
the general public. Moreover, the Court has consistently 
engaged in a balancing test between students’ constitutional 
rights and public schools’ ability to function safely, effectively, 
and autonomously. In contrast, we find that, in Establishment 
Clause cases, the Court has refused to apply a balancing test 
based on the language of the Constitution and the statements 
of the Founding Fathers. We demonstrate, however, that the 
Court still considers the public school context in determining 
whether state officials have violated the Establishment Clause. 
Part III concludes that the Court’s free speech, search 
and seizure, and due process decisions collectively illustrate a 
nuanced version of constitutional scrutiny that can be applied 
to the race-conscious student assignment plans challenged in 
Parents Involved. We show that the Equal Protection Clause is 
not like the Establishment Clause because there is no 
constitutional basis for concluding that the Equal Protection 
Clause is color-blind. We also demonstrate that concerns about 
racial hostility do not serve as a legitimate basis for the Court’s 
refusal to apply a more nuanced version of strict scrutiny to 
race-conscious school assignment plans. Further, we argue that 
if the Court had applied the principles gleaned from its free 
speech, search and seizure, and due process cases, it would 
  
 17  See infra Part I.C.2. 
 18  See infra Part I.C.3. 
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have concluded that a contextualized version of strict scrutiny 
was applicable in the Parents Involved case and that the 
programs under examination were narrowly tailored to the 
compelling governmental interest of facilitating self-selected 
public school diversity. 
I. THE PARENTS INVOLVED DECISION 
In the Parents Involved decision, the Supreme Court 
examined the constitutionality of two school districts’ voluntary 
student assignment plans, which used race as one of the factors 
in making enrollment decisions.19 This section provides an 
overview of the assignment plans and a discussion of the 
various opinions in the case, paying particular attention to the 
Justices’ debate over whether special constitutional rules 
should apply to race-based voluntary desegregation plans.  
A. The Facts of Parents Involved 
Parents Involved was a consolidation of two cases 
involving race-based student assignment policies in Seattle, 
Washington, and Jefferson County, Kentucky.20 In the Seattle 
case, the school district employed a series of tiebreakers to 
determine student assignments to oversubscribed high schools.21 
Under the pertinent tiebreaker, the district sought to ensure 
that the schools were within 10% of the district’s white/nonwhite 
composition, which was 41% white and 59% nonwhite.22 The 
district used this tiebreaker to approve transfer requests from 
students whose race would serve to integrate the student body 
rather than exacerbate any identified racial imbalance.23  
A nonprofit corporation of parents and students who had 
been denied their school preference asserted that the racial 
tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause.24 A federal 
district court held that the use of the tiebreaker was 
constitutional (Parents Involved I).25 Subsequent to a number of 
  
 19 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 710 (2007). 
 20 Id.  
 21 Id. at 711-12. 
 22 Id. at 712.  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 713-14. 
 25 Id. at 714; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 
(Parents Involved I), 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (subsequent 
history omitted). 
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withdrawals, rehearings, and reversals, and a certified question, 
a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the lower court ruling, finding 
that the tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored (Parents Involved 
VI).26 After an en banc hearing, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
panel on the ground that the tiebreaker served a compelling 
interest and was narrowly tailored (Parents Involved VII).27 
Specifically, Parents Involved VII concluded that Seattle’s plan 
served the compelling state interest of “obtaining the 
educational and social benefits of racial diversity in secondary 
education,” and “avoiding racially concentrated or isolated 
schools resulting from Seattle’s segregated housing pattern.”28 
Likewise, the majority of the Ninth Circuit en banc panel held 
that the plan was narrowly tailored to that interest because the 
school district considered and rejected race-neutral means, and 
it only used race as a tiebreaker in limited circumstances. 
Moreover, the school district reviewed the plan periodically to 
determine whether the racial classification was a continued 
necessity.29 
Similarly, the Kentucky school district’s assignment 
plan was designed to make certain that each non-magnet 
school had between 15% and 50% black enrollment.30 The 
district’s racial composition was approximately 34% black and 
66% white.31 Under the plan, students’ requests for school 
preference were approved on the basis of availability and the 
racial integration guidelines.32 Students were denied their 
enrollment choice if it would place the school out of compliance 
with the district’s racial balancing guidelines.33 After students 
had been assigned to schools, they could apply to transfer 
between non-magnet schools in the district.34 The district could 
deny a transfer request based on the racial guidelines.35 The 
district had been under a desegregation decree from 1975 to 
2000, and a similar plan had been instrumental in helping the 
  
 26 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 715; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved VI), 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (subsequent 
history omitted). 
 27 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 715. The Ninth Circuit reheard the case in 
Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (subsequent history omitted). 
 28 Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d at 1179. 
 29 Id. at 1179-92. 
 30 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 716. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. at 716-17. 
 35 Id. at 717. 
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district dismantle the previously segregated system.36 The 
district modified the voluntary assignment plan one year after 
the district court declared the district unitary and dissolved the 
consent decree.37  
A parent whose son was denied transfer to a school close 
to his house on the basis of the district’s integration guidelines 
challenged the student assignment plan on Equal Protection 
Clause grounds.38 The district court held that the plan passed 
constitutional muster under an application of strict scrutiny.39 
The court held that the plan furthered the compelling state 
interest of maintaining the integration gained through 
desegregation and that the use of race was narrowly tailored to 
that end.40 In a per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s decision and adopted its analysis.41 
B. Opinions of the Justices Declaring the Student 
Assignment Plans Unconstitutional 
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether Seattle’s and Louisville’s voluntary assignment plans 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.42 Chief Justice John 
Roberts wrote the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Clarence 
Thomas, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, and Anthony Kennedy,43 
that declared the two assignment plans unconstitutional.44 
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.45 Justice Kennedy 
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but relying on 
analysis separate from the plurality of Roberts, Scalia, Alito, 
and Thomas.46 This subsection provides a summary of the 
opinions that invalidated the student assignment plans in the 
Parents Involved case.  
  
 36 See id. at 715-16. 
 37 See id. at 716. 
 38 Id. at 717. 
 39 McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 849 (W.D. 
Ky. 2004). 
 40 Id. at 855.  
 41 McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam).  
 42 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 710-11.  
 43 Id. at 707. 
 44 See id.  
 45 Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 46 Id. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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1. Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion: The Court’s Majority 
Opinion 
In the Court’s majority opinion,47 Chief Justice Roberts 
declared that all racial classifications are subject to strict 
scrutiny pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.48 He observed 
that the Court had identified two compelling interests: (1) to 
remedy the vestiges of intentional discrimination;49 and (2) to 
attain the beneficial, educational effects of diversity at the 
university level.50 Because the Seattle school district had never 
been subject to a court-ordered desegregation decree and had not 
segregated its schools by law,51 the school district did not have a 
compelling interest to remedy the present effect of past 
discrimination.52 Likewise, although Louisville had been subject 
to a desegregation decree,53 the dissolution of the decree 
precluded the district from claiming a compelling interest in 
eliminating the vestiges of past discrimination.54  
The Court’s opinion also examined whether the two 
school districts could claim that they were acting to achieve the 
compelling interest of student body diversity.55 In Grutter v. 
Bollinger, the Court held that diversity was a compelling 
interest in the context of higher education.56 In Grutter, the 
Court deferred to the law school’s judgment that diversity was 
vital to its educational mission. The Parents Involved Court 
held that the school districts’ enrollment plans were out of 
compliance with Grutter.57 While the racial classification 
sustained in Grutter was part of a “highly individualized, 
holistic review” of applicants,58 race was the determinative 
factor in both school assignment plans.59 Additionally, the plans 
  
 47 Hereafter, we use the term “Court’s opinion” or “majority opinion” to refer 
to those portions of Roberts’s opinion joined by the Court’s majority which included 
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Those sections 
are: Parts I, II, III-A (id. at 711-25), and III-C (id. at 733-35). 
 48 See id. at 720. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. at 722. 
 51 See id. at 720. 
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. at 720-21. 
 55 See id. at 723. 
 56 Id. at 722 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)). 
 57 Id. at 723.  
 58 Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). 
 59 Id. at 723.  
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were too limited because they viewed race solely “in 
white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/‘other’ terms in 
Jefferson County.”60  
Further, the Court held that Grutter did not govern the 
two assignment plans because that decision was based on 
considerations that were applicable only to colleges and 
universities.61 As the Court explained, “in light of ‘the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.’”62 Moreover, the Court concluded that 
the classifications were not narrowly tailored to meet the 
school districts’ diversification objectives.63 Significantly, the 
Court found that the plans had a minimal impact on the racial 
composition of schools’ student population64 and therefore “cast 
doubt” on the necessity and effectiveness of the plans’ racial 
classifications.65 Correspondingly, the Court concluded that the 
districts failed to give bona fide consideration to “workable 
race-neutral alternatives.”66  
2. Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion: The Plurality Opinion 
The plurality opinion67 concluded that the school 
districts’ additional reasons for employing the race-based 
enrollment plans also violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
The school districts asserted two additional compelling 
interests: (1) to reduce racial concentration in their schools and 
(2) to make sure that racially concentrated school patterns did 
not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the best 
schools.68 The plurality found that it did not need to resolve the 
dispute “whether diversity in schools in fact has a marked 
impact on test scores and other intangible . . . socialization 
benefits” because the two plans were not narrowly tailored to 
achieve the educational and social benefits that would result 
  
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 724-25. 
 62 Id. at 724 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).  
 63 Id. at 733-36 (majority opinion). 
 64 See id. at 734. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 735 (majority opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 67 Hereafter, we refer to those portions of Roberts’s opinion joined only by 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito as the “plurality opinion.” Those sections are Part 
III-B (id. at 725-33) and Part IV (id. at 735-48). 
 68 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion). 
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from such diversity.69 The policies were not tied to any 
pedagogic concept that might determine the level of diversity 
needed to attain the asserted educational benefits of diversity; 
rather, the plans were directly linked to the racial 
demographics of each school district.70 Neither district provided 
evidence to explain why the level of racial diversity needed to 
attain the benefits of diversity coincided with the racial 
composition of the school districts.71  
The plurality also found that the assignment plans were 
not narrowly tailored because they had “no logical stopping 
point.”72 As the demographics of the districts would shift, so 
would the racial guidelines of the plans.73 Furthermore, the 
Seattle plan was not narrowly tailored because it was designed 
to address the consequences of racial housing patterns.74 This 
broad goal violated the Court’s holding in Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, which prohibited the use of racial 
classifications to remedy general societal discrimination.75  
3. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence rejected Justice Breyer’s 
claim, in dissent, that the school districts had two compelling 
interests: (1) to prevent resegregation and (2) to eliminate earlier 
school segregation.76 Thomas drew a sharp distinction between 
segregation and racial imbalance.77 He characterized segregation 
in the public school context as “the deliberate operation of a school 
system to carry out a government policy to separate pupils in 
schools solely on the basis of race.”78 By contrast, Thomas defined 
racial imbalance as “the failure of a school district’s individual 
schools to match or approximate the demographic makeup of the 
student population at large.”79 Although racial imbalance might be 
  
 69 Id. at 726.  
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 726-27. 
 72 Id. at 731 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) 
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion))) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 See id.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. at 731-32. 
 76 Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 77 Id. at 749. 
 78 Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79 Id.  
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the result of de jure segregation, it might also be caused by 
private decision-making.80 “Because racial imbalance is not 
inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation, it is not 
unconstitutional in and of itself.”81 Using this logic, Thomas 
concluded that although both Seattle and Louisville might be in 
danger of becoming racially imbalanced, neither school district 
was in danger of resegregation.82  
Thomas also found that the two school districts did not 
have a compelling interest in eliminating earlier school 
segregation.83 According to Thomas, the Court had authorized 
“race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly 
defined circumstances”: (1) where a school that had been 
segregated by law seeks to remedy its past segregation and (2) 
where a governmental agency seeks to remedy past 
discrimination that it had caused.84 Thomas concluded that the 
two school districts’ plans were not justified under the first 
instance.85 Seattle had no prior history of racial segregation.86 
Although Louisville had operated a de jure segregated school 
system, it was no longer under a desegregation decree;87 
therefore, it also had no justification under the second 
category.88 Seattle’s justifications were “forward looking—as 
opposed to remedial.”89 Counsel for Louisville explicitly declared 
that their plan was not devised to eliminate the school district’s 
past discrimination.90  
Justice Thomas made it clear in his concurrence that it 
would be extremely difficult for school districts to establish a 
compelling government interest for racial classifications.91 For 
instance, Justice Thomas stated that a governmental entity 
must establish “a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion 
that remedial action was necessary.”92 To establish this “strong 
basis,” the entity must provide the following findings: (1) the 
  
 80 Id. at 750.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 751.  
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. at 753-54. 
 86 Id. at 753. 
 87 Id. at 753-54. 
 88 Id. at 754. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 756; see also id. at 754-72.  
 92 Id. at 754. 
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extent of its past discrimination, (2) “the scope of any injury 
and the necessary remedy,” and (3) that the remedy is targeted 
at “more than inherently unmeasurable claims of past 
wrongs.”93 Thomas concluded that neither district provided 
sufficient evidence to satisfy that standard.94  
4. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality in that he 
believed that both Seattle and Louisville had compelling interests 
for using race-based student assignment policies.95 He rejected the 
plurality’s suggestion that “the Constitution requires school 
districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in public 
schooling.”96 Justice Kennedy also declared that “diversity, 
depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling 
educational goal [that] a school district may pursue.”97 He 
described diversity in the kindergarten through twelfth grade 
context as an interest in “a diverse student body, one aspect of 
which is its racial composition.”98 
However, despite Justice Kennedy’s belief that a 
compelling interest was at stake, he found that neither school 
district’s student assignment policy was narrowly tailored.99 He 
concluded that Louisville’s school officials did not have a 
“thorough understanding of how [its] plan work[ed]”100 because 
they described it in “broad and imprecise” terms.101 Justice 
Kennedy also agreed with the Court’s opinion that the plans 
were not narrowly tailored because they had minimal impact 
on the number of student assignments that would be affected 
by the policy.102 Consequently, the fact that racial tiebreakers 
were employed only infrequently highlighted the likelihood 
that the school districts could have achieved their goals 
through race-neutral policies.103  
  
 93 Id. at 755. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 96 Id. at 788. 
 97 Id. at 783. 
 98 Id. at 788. 
 99 Id. at 786. 
 100 Id. at 784. 
 101 Id. at 784-85. 
 102 See id. at 790. 
 103 Id. Justice Kennedy provided guidance for school districts seeking to use 
race-conscious measures to provide equal educational opportunities. He declared: 
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C. The Dissent Versus the Majority: Should Student 
Assignment Plans Be Subject to Special Constitutional 
Rules Under Equal Protection? 
The Parents Involved decision is fascinating because of 
the Justices’ discussion concerning whether student 
assignment plans should be subject to special constitutional 
deference pursuant to strict scrutiny or should be subject to a 
less exacting level of scrutiny.104 Two dissents were written in 
conjunction with the case. Justice John Paul Stevens penned a 
short dissent highlighting what he perceived to be 
inconsistencies between the Court’s opinion and landmark 
precedent set in Brown v. Board of Education.105 Justice 
Stephen Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, and David Souter, laid out several arguments 
for why traditional strict scrutiny should not have been applied 
to the student assignment plans.106 The Court’s opinion and the 
concurrences by Justices Thomas and Kennedy responded to 
these challenges.107 This section analyzes the debate. First, we 
examine the arguments advanced by the Justices in dissent 
that traditional strict scrutiny should not apply to Louisville’s 
and Seattle’s race-based school assignment plans. Next, we 
analyze the responses that the three authoring Justices who 
constituted the majority made to Justice Breyer’s contentions. 
  
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of 
certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational 
opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious 
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each 
student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual 
typing by race.  
Id. at 788-89. 
  Justice Kennedy went on to provide examples of general, race-conscious 
approaches to achieve racial diversity that would not be subject to strict scrutiny. 
These possibilities included “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance 
zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating 
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; 
and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.” Id. at 789. By 
contrast, Justice Kennedy found that individualized classifications would be subject to 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 789-90. Although he found that these two plans did not satisfy the 
rigors of strict scrutiny, he did hold out the possibility that a program serving a 
prospective compelling goal could, at least in theory, survive judicial analysis. Id. 
 104  See id. at 744 (plurality opinion); id. at 778-79 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. 
at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 105 See id. at 798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106 See id. at 823-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 107 See id. at 735-48 (plurality opinion); id. at 757-82 (Thomas, J., concurring); 
id. at 790-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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1. Justice Stevens’s Dissent 
Justice Stevens’s short dissent decried the Court’s 
opinion as disrespectful of precedent108 and the Chief Justice’s 
invocation of Brown in support of that conclusion as a “cruel 
irony.”109 He argued that a “rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny 
obscures Brown’s clear message”110 and “that a decision to 
exclude a member of a minority race is fundamentally different 
from a decision to include a member of the minority.”111 He 
reasoned that student assignment systems such as the ones at 
work in Seattle and Louisville did not “stigmatize or exclude” 
and therefore should have been examined differently than the 
segregation policies at issue in Brown.112 In particular, he 
pointed to the Court’s per curiam decision in School Committee 
of Boston v. Board of Education113 that upheld a Massachusetts 
court’s opinion that race-conscious efforts adopted by schools in 
order to achieve equal educational opportunities did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.114 Stevens closed with a pointed 
condemnation of the Court’s holding: 
The Court has changed significantly since it decided School Comm. 
of Boston in 1968. It was then more faithful to Brown and more 
respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction 
that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed 
with today’s decision.115 
2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
On behalf of the dissenting Justices,116 Justice Breyer 
penned a lengthy and detailed dissent. He argued that “[a] 
  
 108 Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109 Id. at 798-99. 
 110 Id. at 800-01. 
 111 Id. at 799 n.3. 
 112 Id. at 799-800. 
 113 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam). 
 114 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 801-02, 801 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id. at 803. The import of Justice Stevens’s final statement is that it 
expresses his belief that the Rehnquist Court would have reached the opposite 
conclusion in Parents Involved. Chief Justice Rehnquist was an Associate Justice on 
the Court when Stevens joined it in 1975. See Members of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010). If Stevens’s assertion is correct, at least five members of 
the Rehnquist Court would have found the plans constitutional (Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). 
 116 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Breyer’s dissenting opinion. 
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that 
the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use 
race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals, 
even when the Constitution does not compel it.”117 In support of 
this assertion, he cited the Court’s statement in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,118 which suggested 
that school officials were empowered with broad authority to 
mandate that schools’ student bodies proportionately reflect 
the racial composition of their districts “in order to prepare 
students to live in a pluralistic society.”119 While Justice Breyer 
acknowledged that this statement was “not a technical holding” 
in Swann, he asserted that the Court established a “basic 
principle of constitutional law . . . that has found wide 
acceptance in the legal culture.”120  
Justice Breyer found further support for this assertion 
in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann.121 In that case, 
the Court claimed that “school authorities have a wide 
discretion in formulating school policy, and . . . as a matter of 
educational policy school authorities may well conclude that 
some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite 
apart from any constitutional requirements.”122 Moreover, in 
Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Board of Education,123 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated, “While I have the gravest doubts that [a 
state supreme court] was required by the United States 
Constitution to take the [desegregation] action that it has 
taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted 
by that Constitution to take such action.”124  
Breyer maintained that these various statements were 
not limited to situations in which districts were under a court-
  
 117 Id. at 823.  
 118 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 119 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 120 Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 121 402 U.S. 43 (1971). 
 122 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 824 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting North 
Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 123 439 U.S. 1380 (1978). 
 124 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 824 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Bustop, 
Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (opinion in chambers)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ordered desegregation decree.125 In McDaniel v. Barresi,126 he 
noted, the Court upheld a voluntarily adopted student 
assignment plan that had no court order.127 Also, in several cases, 
the Court ruled that school districts may have to take race-
conscious action even when there was no evidence of de jure 
segregation.128 Moreover, lower federal and state courts prior to 
Swann had held that school districts were not prohibited by the 
Constitution from reducing de facto segregation and racial 
imbalance in public schools.129 Thus, it followed that “Swann was 
not a sharp or unexpected departure from prior rulings; it 
reflected a consensus that had already emerged among state and 
lower federal courts.”130 Indeed, Breyer continued, “If there were 
doubts before Swann was decided, they did not survive this 
Court’s decision. Numerous state and federal courts explicitly 
relied on Swann’s guidance for decades to follow.”131 Further, 
Breyer counted fifty-one federal statutes, one hundred state 
statutes, and a number of presidential executive orders that 
employed race-conscious measures.132 Moreover, “hundreds of 
local school districts have adopted student assignment plans 
that use race-conscious criteria.”133  
Additionally, Breyer argued that Swann’s statement 
regarding voluntary desegregation policies was not surprising, 
given that it was supported by the well-established purpose 
underlying the Fourteenth Amendment.134 Breyer opined that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted to eliminate 
systematic racial exclusion and to integrate former slaves into 
American society.135 Accordingly, the drafters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment understood the fundamental and practical 
difference between race-conscious classifications intended to 
“keep the races apart” and those intended “to bring the races 
together.”136 Breyer also rejected the assertion that recent 
  
 125 Id. at 824. 
 126 402 U.S. 39 (1971). 
 127 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 824 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing McDaniel 
v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)).  
 128 Id. at 825. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 148-49 (1979). 
 129 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 825-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See, e.g., 
Tometz v. Bd. of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ill. 1968). 
 130 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 827 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 828.  
 133 Id. at 829.  
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
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Supreme Court cases—such as Grutter v. Bollinger,137 Johnson 
v. California,138 and Adarand Constructors v. Pena139—
superseded Swann.140 While Breyer allowed that “[s]everal of 
these cases were significantly more restrictive than Swann in 
respect to the degree of leniency the Fourteenth Amendment 
grants to programs designed to include people of all races,”141 he 
identified two reasons for finding that these cases did not mark 
a critical change in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.142 
First, in more recent decisions, the Court had made clear that 
not all uses of race-conscious criteria must automatically be 
treated the same under strict scrutiny analysis.143 Rather, the 
Court struck down racial classifications that harmfully 
excluded members of other races, but it applied a nonfatal 
version of strict scrutiny to racial classifications that sought to 
include underrepresented groups.144 Breyer further opined that 
the Grutter case, which upheld a law school’s use of a race-
conscious admissions program, provided a clear example of the 
inclusion/exclusion principle.145  
Second, Breyer reasoned that the Grutter case 
demonstrated that “[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-
based governmental action under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”146 Because contexts vary significantly from each other, 
the same “fatal in fact” level of strict scrutiny should not be 
applied automatically.147 Breyer argued that the more flexible 
level of strict scrutiny should be applied to the school districts’ 
  
 137  539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 138 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
 139 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  
 140 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 831-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 141 Id. at 832.  
 142 Id.  
 143 Id. 
 144 See id. at 832-33. 
 145 See id. at 833. 
 146 Id. at 834 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147 Id. at 833. Breyer went on to note that:  
Governmental use of race-based criteria can arise in the context of, for 
example, census forms, research expenditures for diseases [and] assignments 
of police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race neighborhoods . . . . 
Given the significant differences among these contexts, it would be surprising 
if the law required an identically strict legal test for evaluating the 
constitutionality of race-based criteria as to each of them.  
Id. at 834. 
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policies because they were designed to bring the races together 
rather than to keep them apart.148  
Applying this more flexible standard, Breyer concluded 
that the school districts had a compelling interest in attaining 
racial integration.149 This interest contained three elements: (1) 
historical and remedial, (2) educational, and (3) democratic.150 
The historical and remedial element represented the school 
districts’ interests in rectifying the lingering effects of 
segregation caused by school policies.151 This remedial element 
was rooted in the concern that the American public school 
system, in the absence of corrective measures, might undergo 
de facto resegregation.152 Likewise, the educational element 
represented school districts’ “interest in overcoming the 
adverse educational effects produced by and associated with 
highly segregated schools.”153 Finally, the democratic element 
represented school districts’ “interest in producing an 
educational element that reflects the pluralistic society in 
which our children will live.”154  
The dissenting Justices also concluded that the race-
based assignment plans were narrowly tailored.155 One factor 
leading to this conclusion was that the race-conscious criteria 
merely “set the outer bounds of broad ranges.”156 In other words, 
consideration of an applicant’s race was only one minor factor in 
the determination of that student’s placement.157 The primary 
factor in the assignment plans was student choice, not race.158  
The second factor was that the broad-range limitations 
were not very burdensome.159 The Justices found that the broad-
range limits in the race-based assignment plans ensured that 
race only factored into admissions in a fraction of non-merit 
based assignments as opposed to large numbers of merit-based 
  
 148 Id. at 835. Indeed, Breyer noted that a more lenient application of strict 
scrutiny in this case would not imply the abandonment of traditional strict scrutiny. Id. 
at 836. 
 149 See id. at 837. 
 150 Id. at 838-40.  
 151 Id. at 838.  
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 839.  
 154 Id. at 840 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 
16 (1971)). 
 155 Id. at 846. 
 156 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id. at 847. 
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assignments as had been the case in Grutter.160 The fact that 
rejected students still had opportunities to attend 
“substantially equal” schools further substantiated the 
dissent’s finding of lessened burden.161  
The third factor was that the assignment plans relied 
less on race than prior integration plans in the community, such 
as mandatory busing.162 Since the race-based assignment plans 
were relatively less centered on race than mandatory busing and 
other prior integration plans in the school district, the Justices 
found the plans constituted a relatively progressive de-emphasis 
on race.163 Coextensive with the third factor was the Justices’ 
view that local school districts have great expertise in matters 
affecting education and should have latitude to experiment for 
educational excellence, therefore entitling them to judicial 
deference.164 The fourth factor concerned lack of reasonable 
alternatives.165 The dissenting Justices claimed that narrow 
tailoring does not require “proof that there is no hypothetical 
other plan that could work as well.”166 
3. Responses of Justices Making Up the Majority 
a. Court Opinion 
The Justices constituting the majority rejected the 
dissent’s arguments for applying a less stringent standard of 
strict scrutiny to the race-based assignment plans.167 The 
majority opinion dismissed as “dicta” Swann’s statement that 
school districts could voluntarily use race.168 Furthermore, 
Swann was unavailing because the Court in that opinion did 
not address whether a district could voluntarily adopt a race-
based assignment plan without a prior finding of de jure 
segregation.169 The Bustop case was inapposite because it 
  
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 847-48. 
 162 See id.  
 163 See id. at 807.  
 164 Id. at 848-49.  
 165 Id. at 850.  
 166 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 167 Id. at 721 n.10 (majority opinion).  
 168 Id. at 721. 
 169 See id.  
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concerned an emergency injunction,170 which Chief Justice 
Roberts characterized as a clear distinction.171  
b. Plurality Opinion 
The plurality opinion rejected the dissent’s arguments 
for applying a less stringent standard of strict scrutiny to the 
race-based assignment plans.172 The plurality rejected Breyer’s 
interpretation of McDaniel, claiming that McDaniel concerned 
a school district with past de jure segregation.173 Because 
neither Seattle nor Louisville operated—or were acting 
pursuant to—a court order to remedy de jure segregation, 
McDaniel was inapplicable.174 The plurality also disagreed with 
the dissent’s reliance on Swann, labeling the discussion about 
school districts’ voluntary use of race to achieve a culturally 
diverse student body as “pure dicta.”175 The Chief Justice also 
faulted Justice Breyer’s assertion about Swann’s dicta because 
it merely advanced racial balancing as a hypothetical 
government objective without analyzing whether race-based 
classifications would be a constitutionally permissible means 
for achieving that objective.176 The plurality claimed the 
omission was obvious: Swann “did not involve any voluntary 
means adopted by a school district.”177 Thus, even taking Swann 
at its full precedential value would not change the plurality’s 
holding because the racial classifications proposed in 
Louisville’s and Seattle’s school assignment plans were still 
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, most of the 
lower court cases cited by the dissent as proof of Swann’s 
applicability were not pertinent178 because they were all decided 
before the Court had definitely determined that all race 
classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny.179  
The plurality opinion also rejected the dissent’s 
assertion that Grutter was controlling and that the “compelling 
nature of these interests in the context of primary and 
  
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 735-36 (plurality opinion).  
 173 Id. at 736-37. 
 174 Id. at 737.  
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. at 738. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. (citation omitted). 
 179 Id. at 739 n.16.  
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secondary education follow[ed] here a fortiori.”180 The plurality 
emphasized that Grutter focused on the importance of 
conducting an individualized, holistic review instead of using 
race as a primary factor in determining enrollment decisions.181 
Additionally, the dissent’s characterization of the plans as 
narrowly tailored was faulty because it failed to consider how 
the plans functioned, the students they affected, or the school 
“districts’ failure to consider race-neutral alternatives.”182 The 
plurality also rejected Justice Breyer’s claim that the Court 
should defer to the decisions of local school boards.183 Roberts 
countered that such deference “is fundamentally at odds with 
our equal protection jurisprudence”184 and that Court precedent 
put a significant burden on governmental entities to justify any 
use of racial classifications.185 The plurality additionally 
rejected the use of racial classifications because such 
classifications “promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to 
a politics of racial hostility.”186 In pertinent part, the plurality 
stated that racial classifications “reinforce the belief, held by 
too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be 
judged by the color of their skin.”187 Furthermore, racial 
classifications “endorse race-based reasoning and the 
conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus 
contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.”188 
Finally, the plurality asserted that the use of race-based 
classifications went against the heritage of Brown v. Board of 
Education189 and the Fourteenth Amendment.190 Citing the 
  
 180 Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 181 Id. at 740-41 (plurality opinion).  
 182 Id.  
 183 Id.  
 184 Id.  
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. at 746 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 187 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 188 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 189 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 190 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746-47 (plurality opinion). Justice Roberts 
made this clear when he asserted:  
In Brown v. Board of Education . . . we held that segregation deprived black 
children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school 
facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because governmental 
classification and separation on grounds of race themselves denoted 
inferiority. It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally 
separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a 
constitutional violation in 1954 . . . . The next Term, we accordingly stated [in 
Brown II] that “full compliance” with Brown I required school districts to 
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plaintiffs’ brief in Brown, the plurality observed that their 
position could not have been clearer: “[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment prevents states from according differential 
treatment to American children on the basis of . . . race.”191 The 
plurality also pointed out that plaintiffs’ counsel in Brown 
consistently argued that admission into public schools was 
required to be conducted “on a nondiscriminatory basis.”192 
Therefore, the racial classifications challenged in the case in 
chief went against the spirit of Brown and the Fourteenth 
Amendment by determining admission on a racial basis.193 
c. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
Justice Thomas rejected the dissent’s “attempt[] to 
marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution.”194 He 
intoned, “I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My 
view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy: ‘Our 
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.’”195 Justice Thomas also noted that the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in Brown supported this position.196  
Justice Thomas further argued that the dissent’s 
attempt to “pin its interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause to current societal practice and expectations, deference 
to local officials, likely practical consequences, and reliance on 
previous statements from this and other courts”197 was 
dangerous because the Court acted analogously in Plessy to 
justify discriminatory practices.198 Further, the segregationists 
  
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis.  
Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955)). 
 191 Id. at 747.  
 192 Id.  
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. at 772 & n.19 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 195 Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 196 Id.  
 197 Id. at 773.  
 198 Justice Thomas likewise dismissed any reliance on social science research 
in support of the plans. He explained:  
In place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent would permit measures to 
keep the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races apart. 
Although no such distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
dissent would constitutionalize today’s faddish social theories that embrace 
that distinction. The Constitution is not that malleable. Even if current social 
theories favor classroom racial engineering as necessary to “solve the 
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in Brown supported the reliance on current practices and 
deference to local officials to justify public school segregation.199 
Against this historical backdrop, Justice Thomas was unwilling 
to defer to the decision making of school officials.200  
d. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy also objected to the dissent’s call for a 
contextualized application of strict scrutiny. He asserted that 
the general conclusions relied upon by the dissent “have no 
principled limit and would result in the broad acceptance of 
governmental racial classifications in areas far afield from 
schooling,” likening the dissent’s application of strict scrutiny to 
“rational-basis review.”201 Justice Kennedy worried that Congress 
could require the adoption of the Louisville or Seattle plans 
nationwide pursuant to the Commerce or Spending Clauses.202 
Justice Kennedy also rejected the dissent’s reliance on 
the Supreme Court’s higher education cases to justify the racial 
classifications employed by Seattle and Louisville. The districts 
could not rely on Gratz v. Bollinger203 because the admissions 
procedures used in that case relied even less on race than the 
plans presented to the Court in Parents Involved.204 Gratz was 
also distinguished because it arose “in the context of college 
admissions where students had other choices and precedent 
supported the proposition that First Amendment interests give 
universities particular latitude in defining diversity.”205 “Even 
so,” Justice Kennedy pointed out, “the race factor [in Gratz] was 
found to be invalid.”206 Therefore, it followed that if Gratz were 
the appropriate measure, then the Seattle and Louisville plans 
would be “a fortiori invalid.”207 Grutter did not control, he argued, 
  
problems at hand,” the Constitution enshrines principles independent of 
social theories.  
Id. at 780 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).  
 199 Id. at 773.  
 200 As Justice Thomas asked: “Can we really be sure that the racial theories 
that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a relic of the past or that future theories will 
be nothing but beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am unwilling to take, 
and it is one the Constitution does not allow.” Id. at 781-82. 
 201 Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 202 Id.  
 203 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  
 204 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 205 Id.  
 206 Id.  
 207 Id.  
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because the plan approved in that case “was flexible enough to 
take into account ‘all pertinent elements of diversity,’208 and 
considered race as only one factor among many.”209 
Further, Justice Kennedy found that applying permissive 
strict scrutiny would require the Court to set aside two concepts 
designed to lessen the injury and negative consequences arising 
from racial discrimination: (1) “the difference between de jure 
and de facto segregation” and (2) “the presumptive invalidity of 
a state’s use of racial classifications to differentiate its treatment 
of individuals.”210 In the school desegregation cases, Justice 
Kennedy noted that school districts that practiced de jure 
segregation had an affirmative duty to eliminate segregation, 
while districts affected by de facto segregation had no such 
duty.211 Further, “[t]he distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation extended to remedies available to governmental 
units in addition to the courts.”212 Justice Kennedy argued that 
this distinction served the important role of limiting the harm 
that could be caused by racial classifications. Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the argument that school authorities should be 
able to resolve the problems caused by de facto segregation 
through direct, race-based assignments instead of the general 
policies, such as the ones that he proposed; and he explicitly 
reiterated his worries about the dangers of racial classification.213  
II. THE SUPREME COURT, PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
The previous section provided an overview of the 
Parents Involved decision. In dissent, Justice Breyer argued 
that a more nuanced version of strict scrutiny should have been 
  
 208 Id. at 793 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003)).  
 209 Id. at 792 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340).  
 210 Id.  
 211 Id. at 794.  
 212 Id.  
 213 Id. at 796-97. Specifically, Justice Kennedy stated:  
Governmental classifications that command people to march in different 
directions based on racial typologies can cause new divisiveness. The practice 
can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our 
diverse political heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political 
process. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on 
differential treatment based on individual classifications present these 
problems to a lesser degree.  
Id. at 797.  
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applicable. The Justices in the majority rejected this 
contention. However, one major omission in the debate over the 
appropriateness of special constitutional rules for race-based 
assignment plans deserves attention. None of the opinions—
not even Justice Breyer’s dissent—addressed the fact that the 
Court, on several occasions, created special rules for other 
constitutional challenges to public schools’ actions. In disputes 
pitting students’ constitutional concerns against school 
districts’ concerns, the Supreme Court has adjusted the 
constitutional requirements on matters involving free speech, 
search and seizure, and due process.214 On the other hand, the 
Court has rejected arguments to adopt special rules favoring 
the school district in questions that raise Establishment Clause 
concerns.215 Nonetheless, the Court still takes into account the 
context of public schooling in deciding whether the 
government’s actions violated the Establishment Clause.216 Our 
analysis in this section supports the conclusion that the Court 
should apply special constitutional rules to loosen its strict 
scrutiny analysis with respect to race-conscious school 
assignment plans. Furthermore, we will show that this 
proposed precedential shift would be consistent with the 
Court’s previous application of adjusted standards for 
analyzing students’ constitutional rights under the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  
A. Instances in Which the Court Has Created Special 
Constitutional Rules for Public Schools 
1. First Amendment (Free Speech Clause) 
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Supreme 
Court addressed for the first time the rights of students in the 
classroom pursuant to the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause.217 In that case, a school district suspended students who 
wore black armbands in protest against the Vietnam War.218 
The Court held that the suspensions violated the Free Speech 
Clause,219 finding that schools were public places and that 
  
 214 See infra Part II.A. 
 215 See infra Part II.B. 
 216 See infra Part II.B. 
 217 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 218 See id. at 504. 
 219 Id. at 514. 
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students had the right to express their opinions within the 
confines of those institutions.220 The Court famously declared, 
“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”221 Still, the Court cautioned, this right 
must be balanced against the legitimate interests of school 
officials in the safe and orderly operation of schools.222 With 
respect to the armband protest, the Court observed that there 
was no evidence of “interference, actual or nascent, with the 
schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to 
be secure and to be let alone.”223 The Court held that this 
conduct was protected by the Free Speech Clause and 
distinguished it from student speech that “materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others.”224 
Since the landmark Tinker decision, the Supreme Court 
on three occasions has found that the First Amendment rights 
of students pursuant to the Free Speech Clause are limited by 
their school districts’ legitimate interests in operating safe and 
orderly schools. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the 
Court held that school districts could discipline students for 
lewd and indecent speech.225 The Court acknowledged that 
although “[t]he First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in 
matters of adult public discourse,”226 it did not follow that “the 
same latitude must be permitted to children in a public 
school.”227 The Court based the authority of school districts to 
prohibit vulgar speech on their in loco parentis power228 to 
“inculcate the habits and manners of civility.”229 The Court 
reasoned it was necessary for schools to teach these values 
  
 220 See id. at 506.  
 221 Id.  
 222 Justice Fortas, the opinion’s author, explained: “[T]he Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of 
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools.” Id. at 507.  
 223  Id. at 508.  
 224 Id. at 513. This essentially expresses the Tinker substantial disruption test 
which authorizes schools to regulate student speech that would substantially and 
materially disrupt the school or the rights of other students. 
 225 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).  
 226 Id. at 682.  
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 684. In loco parentis is a Latin phrase meaning “in the place of a 
parent” or “instead of a parent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009). 
 229 Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW 
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).  
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because they were “necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system.”230 It was legitimate for schools to 
decide that “the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct 
cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or 
offensive speech and conduct.”231  
In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,232 the Court further described 
the limitations of student expression. The Court ruled that a 
high school principal could remove an article from the school’s 
newspaper that discussed student experiences with pregnancy233 
and another article that discussed students’ experiences with 
divorce.234 While recognizing Tinker’s admonition that public 
school students “do not shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”235 the 
Court pointed out that students’ First Amendment rights were 
not “automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings”236 and “must be applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”237 The Justices 
distinguished the instant case from Tinker.238 While Tinker dealt 
with “educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression 
that happens to occur on the school premises,” Hazelwood 
“concern[ed] educators’ authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive 
activities that students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.”239 The Court characterized the latter set of activities “as 
part of the school curriculum . . . so long as they are supervised 
by faculty members and designed to impart particular 
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.”240  
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over [curricular-
related] expression to assure that participants learn whatever 
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are 
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of 
  
 230 Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 67, 76-77 (1979)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 231 Id. at 683.  
 232 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 233 Id. at 274, 276. 
 234 Id.  
 235 Id. at 280 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 236 Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 237 Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 238 Id. at 270. 
 239 Id. at 271.  
 240 Id. 
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maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school.241  
This authority enabled a school to “‘disassociate itself’ 
. . . from speech that is ungrammatical, poorly written, 
inadequately researched, biased, or prejudiced, vulgar or 
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.”242 Additionally, 
a school could consider the emotional maturity of the intended 
audience before disseminating student speech on potentially 
controversial subjects.243 Schools further retained the authority 
to refuse sponsoring speech that was inconsistent with the 
“shared values of a civilized order.”244 Otherwise, citing Brown, 
the Court observed, “the schools would be unduly constrained 
from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for 
later professional training, and in helping him adjust normally 
to his environment.’”245 
Consequently, the Court concluded that the standard 
established in Tinker for punishing student expression did not 
apply for determining when a school may disseminate student 
expression.246 Instead, the Court ruled that schools did not 
violate the First Amendment in exercising their control over 
the content of student expression in school-sponsored activities 
“so long as their actions [we]re reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”247 This standard was in keeping with the 
Court’s frequently expressed belief that education was 
“primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and 
local officials, and not of federal judges.”248  
Most recently, the Court’s ruling in Morse v. Frederick249 
further emphasized school officials’ legitimate authority over 
student speech when that speech appeared to promote drug 
use. The Court found that the “special characteristics of the 
school setting” enabled a school district to suspend a student 
who hoisted a banner supporting drug use at an off-campus, 
  
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). 
 243 Id. at 272.  
 244 Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 683) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 245 Id. (quoting Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 246  Id. at 272-73. 
 247 Id. at 273.  
 248 Id. 
 249 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
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school-sponsored event.250 At this event, this student—along 
with several others—unfurled a banner that read “BONG HiTS 
4 JESUS,” which the principal believed promoted drug use.251 
After the student refused to take down the banner, the 
principal confiscated it and later suspended the student.252  
The student sued, claiming that the suspension violated 
his First Amendment rights.253 The Court disagreed, holding that 
school districts could restrict student speech at school events 
“when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.”254 In reaching this conclusion, the Court took special note of 
two basic principles taken from the Fraser case.255 The first point 
was that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are 
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”256 While Morse’s speech, like Fraser’s, would have been 
protected if it had occurred outside of the school setting, this 
speech could be limited “in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment.”257 The second principle was that Tinker’s 
substantial disruption test was not absolute.258  
Further, the Court observed that it had recognized in 
the Fourth Amendment context that deterring student drug 
use “is an important—indeed, perhaps compelling interest.”259 
The Court found further support for the importance of 
educating students about the dangers of drug use because 
Congress had provided billions of dollars to support drug 
prevention programs at the state and local level.260 Congress 
had also required schools receiving federal funding under the 
Safe and Drug-Free Schools Community Act of 1994 to confirm 
that their drug prevention programs “convey[ed] a clear and 
consistent message that . . . the illegal use of drugs is wrong 
  
 250 Id. at 393, 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).  
 251 Id. at 397-98. 
 252 Id. at 398.  
 253 Id. at 399.  
 254 Id. at 403. 
 255 Id. at 404-05. 
 256 Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 257 Id. at 405 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969)). 
 258 Id.  
 259 Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 260 Id. at 408. 
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and harmful.”261 Moreover, the Court noted that “[t]housands of 
school boards throughout the country . . . have adopted policies 
aimed at effectuating this message.”262  
The Court concluded that the “special characteristics of 
the school environment . . . and the governmental interest in 
stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict 
student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting 
illegal drug use.”263 The Court distinguished the relaxed 
standard in Morse from Tinker’s material disruption standard 
because it found that a school district’s interest in combating 
student drug use was a more compelling interest than a school 
district’s “abstract desire to avoid controversy.”264  
2. Fourth Amendment  
Another constitutional provision that has raised conflict 
between school districts and students is the Fourth Amendment, 
which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure by government 
agents.265 Generally, police must have probable cause and a 
warrant before conducting a search.266 Before the Supreme Court 
resolved the issue, there had been a debate among the courts as 
to whether the Fourth Amendment applied to searches 
conducted by public school officials,267 and, if so, the appropriate 
constitutional standard for conducting a search.268  
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court concluded 
that, while the Fourth Amendment applied to searches 
conducted by public school officials, a special standard was 
necessary to recognize the particular interests of the school 
environment. In determining the level of protection that should 
be accorded to searches conducted by public school officials, the 
Court struck a balance between the student and school 
  
 261 Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id.  
 264 Id. at 408-09. 
 265 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 266 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 267 The Court resolved this debate in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 
(1985). It reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fourth Amendment 
applicable to the states, and, therefore, unreasonable searches and seizures by state 
officers are prohibited. Id. at 334. The Board of Education is a part of the State, and as 
such is bound by the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Id. at 334 & n.4. 
 268 This issue was also resolved in New Jersey v. T.L.O. See id. at 338-43. 
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concerns.269 Students had a legitimate expectation of privacy, 
which included the right to “carry with them a variety of 
legitimate, non-contraband items, and there was no reason to 
conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy 
in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.”270 
Comparatively, public schools had a substantial interest in 
maintaining order and a proper educational environment.271 
The Court observed that “maintaining security and order in the 
schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school 
disciplinary procedures.”272 Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that the warrant requirement was particularly unsuited to the 
school environment because it “would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
needed in the schools.”273 The Court also found that the 
“accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with 
the substantial need of teachers and administrators for 
freedom to maintain order in the schools [did] not require strict 
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on 
probable cause.”274 
The Court held that reasonableness was the correct 
standard for determining the constitutionality of a search of a 
student in the public school setting.275 Determining 
reasonableness required a two-step inquiry.276 The first question 
asks whether the search “was justified at its inception.”277 The 
second question considers whether the search, as conducted, 
“was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.”278 The Court 
asserted that the reasonableness standard would sufficiently 
balance the concerns of students and school authorities. 
Teachers and administrators would be spared “the necessity of 
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and 
permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates 
of reason and common sense.”279 The reasonableness standard 
  
 269 See id. at 337. 
 270 Id. at 339. 
 271 Id.  
 272 Id. at 340.  
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. at 341.  
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. at 343. 
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also protected students by ensuring that their interests would 
be invaded only to the extent necessary to effectuate “the 
legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.”280 
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,281 the Court 
expanded school officials’ authority with respect to student 
searches. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
permitted random urinalysis as a requirement for all students 
who wished to participate in interscholastic athletics.282 In 
Vernonia, the school district implemented a random urinalysis 
requirement for participation in sports because evidence 
showed that athletes were the leaders of a student drug culture 
in the district, and school officials were worried that drug use 
increased the risk of sports-related injury.283 
The Court held that, while the district’s drug testing 
policy constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, the 
district was not required to obtain a warrant or establish 
probable cause, as was the case in searches by law enforcement 
officials.284 Government officials could conduct a search 
unsupported by probable cause and without a warrant “when 
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, 
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”285 The Court then noted that it had recognized 
the existence of special needs in the public school context that 
did not require school officials to obtain a warrant or establish 
probable cause.286 Quoting T.L.O., the Court observed that “the 
warrant requirement ‘would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
[that are] needed,’ and ‘strict adherence to the requirement 
that searches be based on probable cause’ would undercut ‘the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to 
maintain order in the schools.’”287 While T.L.O. was 
distinguishable because the search approved in that case “was 
based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,” the Court 
found that individualized suspicion was not required because 
  
 280 Id.  
 281 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 282 Id. at 650, 665. 
 283 Id. at 649. 
 284 Id. at 653, 665.  
 285 Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)). 
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“the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of 
such suspicion.”288  
In addition to the Court’s anti-drug finding, one of the 
factors it considered was the nature of the students’ privacy 
interests.289 With respect to students’ privacy interests, the 
Court explained that “Fourth Amendment rights, no less than 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public 
schools than elsewhere: the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot 
disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for 
children.”290 Public schools required students to undergo a 
variety of physical examinations and vaccinations “[f]or their 
own good and that of their classmates.”291 Therefore, with 
regard to medical examinations and procedures, students in 
the public school environment had a lesser privacy expectation 
than the general public.292  
Student athletes had an even lesser expectation of 
privacy because they “voluntarily subject[ed] themselves to a 
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students 
generally.”293 These regulations required student athletes to 
undergo a preseason physical exam, provide a urine sample, 
acquire adequate insurance coverage, and maintain a 
minimum grade point average.294  
In Board of Education of Independent School District 
No. 92 v. Earls,295 the Court once more upheld an expansion of 
school authority. The Earls Court held that a school district 
could require students who participate in competitive 
extracurricular activities other than sports to submit to 
random urinalysis.296 In Earls, the Court rejected the assertion 
that evidence of pervasive drug use was necessary before the 
district could implement a suspicionless drug testing policy.297 
“Given the nationwide epidemic of drug use, and the evidence 
of increased drug use in Tecumseh schools, it was entirely 
reasonable for the School District to enact this particular drug 
  
 288 Id.  
 289 Id. at 654. 
 290 Id. at 656.  
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. at 656-57. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. These were the Vernonia School District athletic regulations. Id. 
 295 536 U.S. 822 (2002).  
 296 Id. at 828, 830.  
 297 Id. at 836. 
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testing policy.”298 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
repeatedly emphasized that the “only consequence of a failed 
drug test is to limit the student’s privilege of participating in 
extracurricular activities.”299  
The Court’s most recent pronouncement in the area of 
students’ Fourth Amendment rights resolved a disputed strip 
search of a thirteen-year-old girl by public school officials in 
Safford Unified School District v. Redding.300 In its analysis, the 
Court reaffirmed the need to balance a student’s rights with a 
school district’s need to maintain order and ensure the safety of 
the entire student body.301 The Court then applied the T.L.O. 
test and held that, while school authorities had reasonable 
suspicion that the pupil had contraband—prescription strength 
ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxem302—the ensuing 
search was not reasonable in scope and therefore violated her 
rights.303 Justice Souter directly addressed the limitation to 
deference to school decision-making when intrusive student 
searches are at issue: 
In so holding, we mean to cast no ill reflection on the assistant 
principal, for the record raises no doubt that his motive throughout 
was to eliminate drugs from his school and protect students . . . [T]he 
Fourth Amendment places limits on the official, even with the high 
degree of deference that courts must pay to the educator’s 
professional judgment. 
We do mean, though, to make it clear that the T.L.O. concern to 
limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of 
reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding 
evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the 
quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of 
intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation 
its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a 
category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.304 
Thus, the Court made clear that, although the ruling 
preserved the special T.L.O. test, the deference afforded school 
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 299 Id. at 833. 
 300 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 301 Id. at 2639. 
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 304 Id. at 2643. 
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officials through its application and, given the special concerns 
of public schools, was not unfettered or without limitation.305 
3. Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) 
The third area in which the Court has applied special 
rules for kindergarten through twelfth grade settings is with 
respect to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In Goss v. Lopez,306 the Court determined the 
procedural due process rights of persons suspended for ten 
days or fewer.307 The Court found that students who were 
suspended for up to ten days were entitled to due process 
because they had a legitimate property interest in a public 
education based on state law.308 In determining the level of due 
process to be accorded to these students, the Court observed 
that, “[a]t a very minimum . . . , students facing suspension and 
the consequent interference with a protected property interest 
must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of 
hearing.”309 The Court noted, however, that the student’s right 
to explain his version of the events was to be balanced against 
the school district’s need to maintain order and discipline.310  
The Court also noted that “the timing and content of the 
notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate 
accommodation of the competing interests involved.”311 The 
student was concerned about “avoid[ing] unfair or mistaken 
exclusion from the educational process, with all of its 
unfortunate consequences.”312 Schools, on the other hand, 
needed to maintain “[s]ome modicum of discipline and order . . . 
if the educational function is to be performed” and relied on 
suspensions as a teaching tool.313  
Balancing the concerns of students and the school, the 
Court rejected the notion “that school authorities must be 
totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their 
  
 305 The Court also determined that since the limitation on strip searches was 
not clearly established at the time Ms. Redding came under suspicion, the principal 
was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. Id. at 2644. 
 306 419 U.S. 565 (1975).  
 307 Id. at 567.  
 308 Id. at 576.  
 309 Id. at 579.  
 310 Id. at 580.  
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 313 Id. at 580. 
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schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency.”314 A student 
facing suspension of ten days or fewer had a right to “be given 
oral and written notice of the charges against him and, if he 
denie[d] them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities 
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”315 The 
Due Process Clause “requires at least these rudimentary 
precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct 
and arbitrary exclusion from school.”316 Still, the Court refused 
to require that hearings connected with short suspensions 
provide students with the opportunity to obtain counsel, to 
cross-examine witnesses, or to call supporting witnesses 
because of the special nature of the educational enterprise.317 
Two years later, in Ingraham v. Wright, the Court 
considered the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause to the imposition of corporal punishment in 
schools.318 The Court held “that corporal punishment in public 
schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest, 
but . . . that the traditional common-law remedies are fully 
adequate to afford due process.”319 Once again, the special 
nature of schools weighed heavily in the Court’s analysis. First, 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, explained that, 
because liberty interests had always encompassed “freedom 
from bodily restraint and punishment,” the state was required 
to comply with due process.320 Accordingly, the case turned on 
“what process is due.”321 To resolve this question, the Court 
noted that the traditional role of corporal punishment in school 
contexts “is to correct a child’s behavior without interrupting 
  
 314 Id. at 581. 
 315 Id.  
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. at 583. Specifically, the Court explained: 
To impose in each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well 
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, 
cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further 
formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary 
nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also 
destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process. 
Id. 
 318 430 U.S. 651 (1977). Ingraham v. Wright also investigated whether 
corporal punishment implicated the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and 
unusual punishment. In a 5-4 opinion, the Court concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment did not apply to corporal punishment in schools. Id. at 671. 
 319 Id. at 672. 
 320 Id. at 673-74 (footnote and internal citation omitted). 
 321 Id. at 674. 
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his education.”322 As with First and Fourth Amendment rights, 
the Court examined the competing interests at stake and 
recognized that children faced some risk when disciplinarians 
resorted to corporal punishment.323 Even so, the Court was 
unwilling to impose notice and hearing requirements in 
advance of any corporal punishment, reasoning that any 
procedures that would protect students against wrongful 
punishment would not outweigh the “costs” they would impose 
on the orderly operation of schools.324 For instance, teachers 
may decide to resort to less effective disciplinary strategies 
instead of corporal punishment because of “the possible 
disruption that prior notice and a hearing may entail.”325 
Ultimately, the Court held that the Due Process Clause does 
not require public schools to provide notice and a hearing 
before imposing corporal punishment. This holding 
demonstrated the Court’s belief that the school district’s 
interest in maintaining effective and flexible disciplinary 
control over its students outweighed the need to strictly enforce 
students’ due process rights.326 
B. Denial of Special Constitutional Tests: The 
Establishment Clause  
As noted above, the Supreme Court has created special 
constitutional rules recognizing that students’ rights are not 
“coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”327 By 
contrast, the Court has consistently refused to develop special 
constitutional rules in Establishment Clause challenges where 
students are compelled or coerced to adopt a particular 
religious viewpoint. In each of these cases, the Court noted that 
the Founding Fathers were especially concerned that state-
sponsored religious exercises posed a serious danger to freedom 
of conscience.328 Therefore, the Court was unwilling to accept 
  
 322 Id. at 674 n.43. 
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 327  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). See generally 
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the arguments raised by the public schools that would have 
permitted the religious activity if the facts led to the conclusion 
that state action “established” religion.  
In School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. 
Schempp,329 the Court held that the state practice of requiring 
schools to begin each day with a Bible reading violated the 
Establishment Clause. In reaching this decision, the Court 
discussed the relationship between the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause 
prohibits “a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a 
concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that 
official support of the State or Federal Government would be 
placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.”330 The 
Court explained that to withstand an Establishment Clause 
challenge, legislation must have a secular purpose and must 
neither advance nor inhibit religion.331 
Comparatively, the Free Exercise Clause “recognizes the 
value of religious training, teaching and observance and, more 
particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own 
course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the 
state.”332 The purpose of the Free Exercise Clause “is to secure 
religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions 
thereof by civil authority.”333 To establish a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
enactment has a coercive effect on his ability to practice his 
religion.334 Thus, the Court concluded that the difference 
between the two clauses is that the Free Exercise Clause 
  
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating direct funding to private 
religious schools)); (2) cases which deal with prayer (see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (allowing a student-led religious group at a public high school); 
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating the practice 
of daily prayers over the school’s intercom)); and (3) cases which deal with religion in 
the curriculum (see, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating a 
state statute requiring the teaching of Creationism whenever evolution was taught); 
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (invalidating 
religious instruction delivered on public school grounds)). The universe of cases is too 
numerous to include a summary of each here. Rather, we focus on the prayer cases and 
have selected those cases that discuss the tension between the Establishment Clause 
and other First Amendment rights, whether speech or exercise of religion. We also 
focus on those cases most recently decided by the Court. 
 329 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 330 Id. at 222. 
 331 Id.  
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 333 Id. at 223. 
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requires a showing of coercion, while the Establishment Clause 
does not.335  
Applying these principles, the Court found that the 
practice of Bible reading violated the Establishment Clause.336 
The fact that students could absent themselves upon parental 
request was no defense to the finding of unconstitutionality. 
Further, the Court held that it was no defense that the 
religious practices were “minor encroachments on the First 
Amendment.”337 In reaching this decision, the Court cited 
Memorial & Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,338 
written by James Madison, the principal architect of the Bill of 
Rights.339 Writing for the Court, Justice Clark warned that 
“[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may 
all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of 
Madison, ‘it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on 
our liberties.’”340 In addition, the Court rejected the argument 
that the refusal to permit Bible reading in the public schools 
violated the free exercise rights of the majority. “While the 
Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to 
deny the rights of free exercise to anyone,” the Court explained, 
“it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of 
the State to practice its beliefs.”341  
The Supreme Court provided further instruction on the 
relationship between the Religion Clauses in Board of 
Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.342 
Mergens involved a high school student who wished to create a 
student-led religious group. School officials denied the request 
on the rationale that to do otherwise would create a symbolic 
link between the school and religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.343 To consider this contention, the Court 
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 336 Id. 
 337 Id. at 225. 
 338 Id. at 213.  
 339 See JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 1772-1836 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Library of 
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 340 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (quoting MADISON, supra note 339). 
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 343 Id. at 231. The plaintiffs alleged that school officials must allow formation 
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applied an endorsement analysis, which requires examination 
of whether a reasonable observer would perceive a 
governmental endorsement of religion.344 If so, then the activity 
is impermissible under the Establishment Clause, even if it 
results in curtailment of students’ right to exercise religion or 
express themselves from a religious viewpoint.345 Given the 
broad array of student clubs available at the high school in 
question, the Court concluded that a reasonable observer would 
comprehend that school officials were merely accommodating 
the myriad interests of its students, not endorsing the activity 
in question.346 What is telling about this analysis is the Court’s 
tacit acceptance of the absolute prohibition formed by the 
Establishment Clause. Had the endorsement test confirmed 
school officials’ concerns about a violation, the denial of the 
students’ request would have been proper.347  
The Court next addressed the obligation of public 
schools to adhere to the Establishment Clause in Lee v. 
Weisman,348 where the majority ruled that the practice of 
including nonsectarian prayer in public school graduations 
violated the Establishment Clause because it coerced those in 
attendance to act in a religious manner.349 In Lee and in keeping 
with tradition for that school, the principal decided to include 
an invocation and a benediction in the ceremony. The principal 
chose the religious participant—a rabbi—and also provided the 
rabbi a pamphlet with guidelines as to how to conduct a 
nonsectarian prayer.350 The school argued that the justification 
for the nonsectarian prayer was to advance tolerance and help 
students learn to live a pluralistic society.351  
In reaching the conclusion that the practice violated the 
First Amendment, the Court made a subtle shift from Schempp 
in discussing the relationship between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
  
not created the requisite “limited open forum.” The Court rejected this contention, 
pointing to the scuba club and chess club as examples of non-curriculum-related clubs. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 244-46. As such, the Court held that the Equal Access Act applied 
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explained, “The principle that government may accommodate 
the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental 
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond 
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise.”352 Thus, the Court recognized that the 
government could violate the Establishment Clause by coercing 
citizens to act in a religious manner. 
The Court found that the school’s involvement in the 
development of the school prayers violated this principle. The 
school’s extensive involvement in the selection of the rabbi could 
create divisiveness because “subtle coercive pressures exist . . . 
where the student had no real alternative which would have 
allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance of participation.”353 
The school countered that its directions for the content of the 
prayers were “a good-faith attempt by the school to ensure that 
the sectarianism which is so often the flashpoint for religious 
animosity be removed from the graduation ceremony.”354 While 
the school’s concern was understandable, Justice Kennedy 
observed that its good faith was not the issue. Instead, the 
pertinent question was whether the school could legitimately 
invite someone to produce a prayer for a formal religious 
exercise, which all students would be required to attend.355  
The Court found that the school’s actions were indeed 
illegitimate. Justice Kennedy explained that the Religion 
Clauses were not merely designed to protect the rights of 
minorities; they also existed “to protect religion from 
government interference.”356 These concerns led Justice Kennedy 
to conclude that the school officials’ creation of a nonsectarian 
prayer violated the Establishment Clause because the 
involvement of school officials “will be perceived by the students 
as inducing a participation they might otherwise reject.”357  
Justice Kennedy also rejected the school’s claim that the 
practice of nonsectarian prayer during graduation was 
justifiable as a bulwark against intolerance because it 
overlooked a fundamental difference between freedom of 
  
 352 Id. at 587. 
 353  Id. at 588. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Id. at 589. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. at 590. 
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worship and freedom of speech.358 While “[t]he Free Exercise 
Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has 
close parallels in the speech provisions of the First 
Amendment,” Justice Kennedy explained, “the Establishment 
Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in 
religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech 
provisions.”359 The reason for this difference rested in the fear of 
the Founding Fathers that “what might begin as a tolerant 
expression of religious views may end in a policy to 
indoctrinate and coerce.”360  
The Court’s decision in Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe361 solidified the precedent established in Lee. 
Santa Fe once again involved religious expression, though this 
time led by students prior to high school football games.362 The 
school district had a long history of sponsoring prayers before 
sporting events, which even included an elected student 
“chaplain” to deliver the prayers.363 Although that policy had 
been replaced, the prayers before football games continued.364 
The district argued that they had created a “limited open 
forum” for the purpose of student expression before each 
game.365 Therefore, officials claimed the speech was “private” 
and not governmental speech, placing it outside the ambit of 
the Establishment Clause.366 The Court rejected this thinking. 
That the prayers were student-led was insufficient to 
transform the practice from governmental speech into private 
speech.367 Justice Stevens, writing for a six-Justice majority,368 
again employed an endorsement analysis, concluding that the 
  
 358 Id. at 591. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. at 592. Justice Kennedy concluded with the reminder that 
The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the modern world as in 
the 18th century when it was written. One timeless lesson is that if citizens 
are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its 
own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief 
which is the mark of a free people. 
Id. 
 361  530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 362 Id. at 294. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Id. at 297-98. 
 365 Id. at 301. 
 366 Id. at 302. 
 367 See id. at 302-05. 
 368 Id. at 292. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. 
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public would “perceive the pregame message as a public 
expression of the views of the majority of the student body 
delivered with the approval of the school administration.”369 
Moreover, the Court noted that any analysis of endorsement 
must take into consideration the history and context of the 
policy and practice under scrutiny.370 In this instance, the Court 
concluded that the revised policy was written in order “to 
preserve the practice of prayer before football games.”371 While 
the Court’s ruling did not prohibit private religious activity, it 
cautioned that “the religious liberty protected by the 
Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors 
the particular religious practice of prayer.”372  
This balance between private voluntary prayer and 
state-orchestrated prayer was again at issue in Good News 
Club v. Milford Central School.373 This case challenged a school 
district’s denial of a request to use school facilities immediately 
after school by a Christian club designed for elementary school 
children.374 The club claimed the free speech right to meet since 
the school district allowed other non-school groups to meet 
during the same time frame.375 The school district maintained 
that allowing the religious club to meet would violate the 
Establishment Clause, noting that elementary-aged children 
would not be able to discern the difference between endorsing 
the activity and merely accommodating it.376 The Court, 
  
 369 Id. at 307-08. Justice Stevens listed a number of contextual factors 
supporting the conclusion of endorsement:  
The actual or perceived endorsement of the message, moreover, is established 
by factors beyond just the text of the policy. Once the student speaker is 
selected and the message composed, the invocation is then delivered to a 
large audience assembled as part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored 
function conducted on school property. The message is broadcast over the 
school’s public address system, which remains subject to the control of school 
officials. It is fair to assume that the pregame ceremony is clothed in the 
traditional indicia of school sporting events, which generally include not just 
the team, but also cheerleaders and band members dressed in uniforms 
sporting the school name and mascot. The school’s name is likely written in 
large print across the field and on banners and flags. 
Id. 
 370 Id. at 308 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (invalidating a 
moment of silence statute because of an expressed preference for prayer)). 
 371 Id. at 309. 
 372 Id. at 313. 
 373  533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 374 Id. at 103. 
 375 Id. at 102, 104. 
 376 Id. at 112-13. 
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however, disagreed that the perceptions of the young children 
attending the school determined the constitutionality of the 
issue.377 Rather, since no student could attend a club meeting 
without parental permission, the Court reasoned that whether 
the religious club would be viewed as an endorsement of 
religion needed to be considered from the parents’ 
perspective.378 In other words, whether such a club violated the 
Establishment Clause turned on whether a reasonable parent 
familiar with all the circumstances of after-school clubs at the 
school would perceive an endorsement of religion or feel coerced 
by the state to allow their child to attend.379 Applying this test, 
the Court concluded that the Constitution posed no barrier to 
allowing the club to meet.380  
Interestingly, just as the Court has cited the unique 
relationship between schools and children to declare special 
rules with regard to students’ rights to freedom of expression, 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and due 
process, the Court has referenced the same context to exercise 
caution when interpreting the Establishment Clause. As the 
court noted in Edwards v. Aguillard: 
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance 
with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. 
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, 
but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom 
will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may 
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family. 
Students in such institutions are impressionable and their 
attendance is involuntary.381 
Thus, even with respect to the more restrictive Establishment 
Clause, the Court has taken into account the context of 
schools in determining whether the school has violated the 
rights of children.  
III. APPLICATION OF GENERAL SCHOOL LAW PRINCIPLES TO 
RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS 
In the previous section, we examined various 
constitutional challenges mounted by students against schools to 
  
 377 Id. at 115-16. 
 378 Id. at 115. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. 
 381 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987). 
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determine when the Supreme Court has developed special rules 
for the public school context. We found that in the context of free 
speech, search and seizure, and due process, the Court has held 
that public school students do not possess the same level of rights 
as the general public.382 In each of these cases, the Court reached 
this conclusion by balancing school district and student 
concerns.383 The only exception we have found to this general rule 
is the Establishment Clause cases. The Court has refused to 
engage in a school-specific test because of the special language of 
the Religion Clauses and the declarations of the Founding 
Fathers.384 However, the Court has referenced schools’ unique 
context when analyzing the Establishment Clause.385 
In this section, we explain that the Parents Involved 
decision should be analyzed in the same fashion as the majority 
of student rights’ cases in which the Court has developed 
special constitutional rules for the public school setting, and 
that the Equal Protection Clause is different from the 
Establishment Clause.  
A. Is the Equal Protection Clause Like the Establishment 
Clause? 
When examined against the backdrop of other school 
law cases, it becomes clear that the Justices making up the 
plurality in the Parents Involved case believe that Equal 
Protection cases should be treated in the same manner as the 
Establishment Clause cases. In other words, they reject the 
application of a balancing test because the Equal Protection 
Clause requires all racial classifications to be examined in the 
same manner. For example, recall that Chief Justice Roberts 
stated that the Constitution “prevents states from according 
differential treatment to American children on the basis of 
their color or race.”386 Also recall Justice Thomas’s assertion 
that the Constitution is “color-blind.”387  
However, an examination of the language of, and the 
history behind, the Equal Protection Clause reveals that this 
  
 382 See supra Part II. 
 383 See generally supra Part II.A. 
 384 See supra Part II.B. 
 385 See supra Part II.B. 
 386 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007) (plurality opinion) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 387 Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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constitutional provision contains no such prohibition. Andrew 
Kull, in his volume, The Color-Blind Constitution, observes, 
“The interesting fact that the Congress in 1866 considered and 
rejected a series of proposals that would have made the 
Constitution explicitly color-blind has been, in consequence, 
largely forgotten.”388 Indeed, educational historian James 
Anderson notes that the Republicans introduced seven versions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment that contained a provision 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or color—all 
were rejected.389 After all these proposals had been defeated, 
Congress then accepted a version of the Equal Protection 
Clause that replaced the color-blind provisions with an “equal 
protection” provision “that protected undefined rights against 
state infringement but avoided any principle that would forbid 
discrimination on account of race or color.”390  
According to James Anderson, “The change that was made 
allowed states to discriminate by race as deemed appropriate, 
especially in the arena of ‘social rights’ that included education.”391 
Furthermore, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed 
that “provisions forbidding distinctions of race and color had to be 
dropped in order to gain enough support for the passage and 
eventual ratification by the states.”392 “In other words,” Anderson 
explained, “they left the constitutional question of racial 
classifications by government unresolved.”393 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court should not pretend that they are limited by a 
color-blind Equal Protection Clause.394  
Even Justice Harlan’s invocation of the term “color-
blind” in his famous dissent to Plessy does not provide 
justification for reading the Constitution to prohibit all racial 
classifications. Rather, his use of the term relates to the use of 
“color” as a means to establish a ruling class who then enacts 
laws “cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the 
[Civil] [W]ar.”395 Nothing in Justice Harlan’s opinion examines 
race-conscious actions taken to further the intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, that is, to provide people of color with 
  
 388 ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 69 (1992). 
 389 James D. Anderson, Race-Conscious Educational Policies Versus a Color-
Blind Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 36 EDUC. RESEARCHER 249, 254 (2007).  
 390 Id. at 254.  
 391 Id. at 255.  
 392 Id.  
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equal opportunities enjoyed by white citizens. Justice Stevens 
made the same point when chiding the majority opinion for 
neglecting this seminal distinction and the fact that the policies 
at issue in Brown only negatively affected one race.396  
Further support for the proposition that Harlan’s use of 
the term “color-blind” was not intended to eliminate all racial 
classifications is found in another of Harlan’s opinions. Only 
three years after Plessy, Harlan wrote the Court’s opinion in a 
segregated school case, Cumming v. Richmond County Board of 
Education.397 Cumming involved a challenge to a Georgia school 
district’s decision to close the high school that served the 
district’s African American children while maintaining the 
school that served white children.398 In a unanimous opinion, 
the Court upheld the board’s decision. Justice Harlan wrote: 
The state court did not deem the action of the board of education in 
suspending temporarily and for economic reasons the high school for 
colored children a sufficient reason why the defendant should be 
restrained by injunction from maintaining an existing high school for 
white children. It rejected the suggestion that the board proceeded in 
bad faith or had abused the discretion with which it was invested by 
the statute under which it proceeded or had acted in hostility to the 
colored race. Under the circumstances disclosed, we cannot say that 
this action of the state court was, within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the state to the plaintiffs and to 
those associated with them of the equal protection of the laws or of 
any privileges belonging to them as citizens of the United States. We 
may add that while all admit that the benefits and burdens of public 
taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against 
any class on account of their race, the education of the people in 
schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the 
respective states, and any interference on the part of Federal 
authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified 
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights 
secured by the supreme law of the land.399 
Had Harlan’s use of the term “color-blind” Constitution had the 
meaning ascribed to him by Justice Thomas, he would have 
likewise dissented from the Cumming decision. To the contrary, 
  
 396 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 799 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Stevens noted that Chief Justice Roberts’s attempts to revise history caused him to 
recall “Anatole France’s observation: ‘[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], . . . forbid[s] 
rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their 
bread.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting LE LYS ROUGE (THE RED LILY) 95 (W. 
Stephens trans., 6th ed. 1922)). 
 397 175 U.S. 528, 528 (1899). Interestingly, neither Justice Thomas nor any of 
the other opinion authors in Parents Involved reference or discuss Cumming. 
 398 Id. at 530. 
 399 Id. at 545.  
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he concluded that a school district could offer no high school 
education to a group of children solely based on the color of their 
skin and do so without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.400 
Moreover, even if one concludes as did the plurality in 
Parents Involved that a “color-blind” interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause has evolved over time, and even if one 
concludes that this view of the Fourteenth Amendment 
parallels the Establishment Clause as a strict prohibition 
against state action, it does not follow that every use of race to 
serve nonremedial ends is per se unconstitutional. As our 
review of cases involving school-sponsored religion 
demonstrates, the Court still engages in a careful examination 
of context in order to determine whether state officials have 
violated or run the risk of contravening the Establishment 
Clause. The fact that religion arises in the public school context 
is not sufficient to dictate the outcome. Dispositive contextual 
factors include whether the officials’ purpose was legitimate 
and secular;401 whether the activity was compulsory or 
voluntary;402 whether it occurred during instructional or non-
instructional time;403 whether state officials led the exercise or 
used the “machinery of the state” to encourage or discourage 
  
 400 In the same case, Harlan also wrote:  
The substantial relief asked is an injunction that would either impair the 
efficiency of the high school provided for white children or compel the board 
to close it. But if that were done, the result would only be to take from white 
children educational privileges enjoyed by them, without giving to colored 
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Id. at 544. 
 401 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 402 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594-95 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 
(1990); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
 403 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2000); 
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251. 
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religion;404 whether individuals are treated similarly regardless 
of religious beliefs;405 and whether a reasonable observer 
knowledgeable about the history and context would perceive a 
state endorsement of religion.406 Accordingly, even the extra 
“vigilance” afforded the application of the Establishment 
Clause in public school settings does not result in an analysis 
that is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”407 Just as nothing in 
the Establishment Clause precludes a contextual 
interpretation of the amendment, nothing in the text or history 
of the Equal Protection Clause provides the foundation for a 
rigid interpretation of the provision excluding the observation 
that “[c]ontext matters.”408  
B. Are Race-Conscious Policies Inherently Improper 
Because They Imply “Racial Inferiority” and Create 
“Racial Hostility”? 
Another justification for the Court’s unyielding 
application of strict scrutiny to race-conscious policies 
regardless of context is the alleged propensity for such policies 
to spawn notions of “racial inferiority” and consequent “racial 
hostility.” Recall that Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern 
that such propensity409 could “reinforce the belief . . . that 
individuals should be judged by the color of their skin,”410 which 
then could lead to “a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus 
contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict.”411 
Consequently, Roberts concluded, any use of race in the 
absence of a judicial remedial order threatened racial harmony. 
The pathway to equal protection was clear to the Chief Justice, 
who declared simply, “The way to stop discrimination on the 
  
 404 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312; Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-
93; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226. 
 405 See, e.g., Good News, 533 U.S. at 114; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252. 
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 407 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(describing the problems associated with a rigid application of strict scrutiny in Equal 
Protection Clause matters). 
 408 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).  
 409 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (plurality opinion) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 410 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 411 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”412 
Also, Justice Kennedy in his concurrence warned that 
“classifications . . . based on racial typologies can cause a new 
divisiveness” and “lead to corrosive discourse” where race 
serves “as a bargaining chip in the political process.”413 
Unfortunately, this apprehension neglects two critical 
aspects of the school programs under scrutiny. First, both 
programs at issue were forms of school choice.414 The traditional 
method of student assignment in the United States has long 
linked the school a child attends to the location of the family 
residence.415 The earliest school choice programs, so-called 
magnet schools,416 evolved in direct relationship to the country’s 
desegregation efforts.417 Districts, weary of forced busing 
programs, adopted systems designed to induce parents to enroll 
their children in schools they otherwise would be unlikely or 
reluctant to attend, thereby achieving integration voluntarily.418 
Accordingly, these early school choice programs were designed 
to quell, not inflame, racial animosity. Moreover, to attract 
parents who were neutral or opposed to integration, these 
  
 412 Id. at 748. 
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CONTEXT AND CHARACTER OF THREE MAGNET SCHOOLS (1986).  
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magnet schools developed unique curricular offerings as a 
“carrot” to encourage parents and students to select those 
schools.419 Parents could enroll their children in these choice 
schools only by choosing to integrate. Enrollment patterns were 
carefully monitored and only choices that furthered the 
integrative intent of the program were permitted.420  
Interestingly, the issue of magnet schools came up early 
in oral arguments regarding the Seattle program. Notice Justice 
Scalia’s recognition of the voluntariness associated with magnet 
schools in his conversation with attorney Harry J.F. Korrell, 
who represented the plaintiffs challenging the program: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: You would object, then, to magnet schools? You 
would object to any system that is designed to try to cause people 
voluntarily to go into a system that is more racially mixed?  
MR. KORRELL: Justice Scalia, our objection to the Seattle program 
is that it is not a race neutral means.  
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I understand. But I’m trying to find what, 
you know, the outer limits of your contentions are. It doesn’t seem to 
me that your briefs indicated that you would object to something like 
magnet schools. The—even if one of the purposes of those schools is 
to try to cause more white students to go to schools that are 
predominantly non-white. It’s just voluntary, I mean, but the object 
is to achieve a greater racial mix.421 
Unfortunately, neither school district attorney articulated that 
both the Seattle and Louisville programs shared with magnet 
schools both the purpose and effect of voluntarily integration.422 
Indeed, both intradistrict and interdistrict open enrollment 
programs evolved over time as companion tools to magnet 
schools in districts’ integration arsenals.423  
The program operated in Louisville perhaps best 
illustrates this evolution. The school board created a program 
that allowed parents to list enrollment preferences for each 
child.424 However, rather than eliminate neighborhood 
assignment in its entirety, each child was assigned a “resides 
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school” based on where the child lived.425 Accordingly, the 
“resides” or residential assignment school became a sort of 
default enrollment for each child and, indeed, more than half of 
all students attended their “resides school.”426 Assignments to 
other schools occurred only if the parent requested a transfer.427 
Therefore, participation in Louisville’s transfer program, just 
like participation in magnet programs, was voluntary on the 
part of parents. 
More importantly, both the Seattle and Louisville 
programs existed specifically and explicitly to produce 
integrated schools without forcing children to be bused to 
schools outside their neighborhoods without parental 
approval.428 And since urban neighborhoods, even in modern 
times, tend to be racially identifiable,429 establishing a system 
that induces parents to select schools for reasons other than 
proximity to residence is inextricably intertwined with de facto 
segregation in housing. Rather than attempting to alter these 
residential patterns—a goal clearly outside the purview of 
school policy-making authority—open enrollment programs 
provide an incentive to parents to reach beyond their 
neighborhoods for educational opportunities. Properly 
understood then, it is clear such programs “seek to open minds 
about and to offset the effects of those [housing] patterns—to 
challenge and to be certain that those patterns are not 
determinative of [educational] opportunity.”430  
Second, the only way the majority’s conclusion about 
racial hostility makes sense is if one accepts the proposition 
that neither the City of Seattle nor the City of Louisville 
experiences any racial hostility in the absence of the school 
assignment policies, or if there is actual evidence that use of 
the plan has enflamed existing hostility. Both propositions lack 
any foundation. Allowing schools to become racially identifiable 
would be more likely to engender racial hostility than a 
program expressly designed to bring races together in 
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preparation to live and work in a pluralistic society. Research 
has consistently shown that intergroup conflict and stereotypic 
thinking decreases when children are educated in integrated 
settings.431 Furthermore, no evidence exists that the Seattle or 
Louisville plans had any causal relationship to racial tensions 
in either city. 
And yet the Chief Justice’s discussion of racial hostility 
completely ignored both the fact that racial animosity has never 
been eradicated from our society and that educational programs 
have played a central role in addressing that racial enmity, both 
historically and contemporarily. Nor did his discussion of the 
potential for racial hostility consider the very real possibility 
that allowing parents unfettered choices will likely exacerbate 
racial isolation.432 The Brown Court reviewed and accepted 
evidence that the dual program struck down by its decision 
caused children to infer that they lacked ability simply because 
their skin was black.433 As Chief Justice Warren explained, 
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their 
educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas 
case . . . [and] is amply supported by modern authority.434  
  
 431 For a review of that research, see Brief of American Educational Research 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-9, Parents Involved, 551 
U.S. 701 (Oct. 10, 2006) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915). 
 432 Policy Brief, Roslyn Arlin Mickelson et al., School Choice and Segregation 
by Race, Class, and Achievement (Mar. 2008), available at http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/ 
documents/EPSL-0803-260-EPRU.pdf.  
 433 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).  
 434 Id. In a footnote to this passage, the Court cited extensive social science 
research concluding that segregation led children to impute feelings of inferiority:  
K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality 
Development (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 
1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; 
Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A 
Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are 
the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal 
Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, 
Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 
1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And 
see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).  
Id. at 494 n.11. 
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Unlike the segregation programs at issue in Brown, the policies 
in Seattle and Louisville fell on students of all races.435 
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts cited neither evidence nor any 
research similar to that accepted by the Brown Court to show 
that any students were caused to feel inferior because of the 
programs at issue.436 
Judicial consideration of “hostility” in relation to 
bringing diverse groups of students together is not limited to 
Equal Protection jurisprudence. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
other context in which the Court has addressed this concern is 
in relation to religious divisions. For example, the dissenting 
Justices in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris—which established the 
constitutionality of publicly funded school voucher programs 
that permitted religious school participation—raised concerns 
that the political struggles to preserve or expand voucher 
programs could engender political divisions along religious 
lines.437 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dismissive response to these 
concerns in relation to constitutional analysis is quite telling. 
Justice Breyer would raise the invisible specters of “divisiveness” 
and “religious strife” to find the program unconstitutional. It is 
unclear exactly what sort of principle Justice Breyer has in mind, 
considering that the program has ignited no “divisiveness” or “strife” 
other than this litigation. Nor is it clear where Justice Breyer would 
locate this presumed authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a 
program that they have chosen but that we subjectively find 
“divisive.” We quite rightly have rejected the claim that some 
speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the constitutionality 
of educational aid programs.438 
  
 435  For the Seattle Program, see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 711-12 
(2007). For the Jefferson County Program, see id. at 715-17. 
 436  See generally id. at 701-48 (partially majority and partially plurality opinion). 
 437 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). As Justice Breyer explained: 
School voucher programs finance the religious education of the young. And, if 
widely adopted, they may well provide billions of dollars that will do so. Why 
will different religions not become concerned about, and seek to influence, the 
criteria used to channel this money to religious schools? Why will they not 
want to examine the implementation of the programs that provide this 
money—to determine, for example, whether implementation has biased a 
program toward or against particular sects, or whether recipient religious 
schools are adequately fulfilling a program’s criteria? If so, just how is the 
State to resolve the resulting controversies without provoking legitimate 
fears of the kinds of religious favoritism that, in so religiously diverse a 
Nation, threaten social dissension?  
Id. at 723-24. 
 438 Id. at 662 n.7. 
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Yet neither Roberts nor Kennedy adhered to the Court’s 
previous wholesale rejection of speculative divisiveness when 
they analyzed the constitutionality of Louisville’s and Seattle’s 
race-conscious school assignment plan in Parents Involved. 
In deciding another case, Chief Justice Rehnquist also 
addressed the relationship between individual choices and 
perceptions of state hostility. Locke v. Davey examined 
limitations on a publicly funded scholarship program in the 
higher education context.439 The state of Washington had 
created the program with one limitation—that funds could not 
be used for the study of theology for the purpose of entering the 
ministry.440 Individuals pursuing other vocations could use 
scholarship funds to support enrollment in various religious 
classes. In reaching the conclusion that the limitation did not 
offend the First Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, examined whether the state denial of the 
individual’s choice evinced hostility toward religion.441 He 
concluded that it did not.442 As he explained: 
[W]e find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of the 
Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise 
Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward 
religion. Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, 
we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for 
vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally 
suspect. Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey’s claim 
must fail. The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of 
devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding 
places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars.443 
Likewise, concerns about racial hostility stemming from school 
districts’ use of race-conscious approaches lack merit when the 
“historic and substantial state interest at issue” is juxtaposed 
against the “relatively minor burden” of some students being 
denied their first choice of school assignment.444 Arguably, 
Davey’s burden was even greater than that of the petitioner in 
Parents Involved. Davey had to forgo public funding if he 
wished to follow his chosen vocation445—and yet his “burden” is 
  
 439 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 440  Id. at 715. 
 441 Id. at 721. 
 442 Id. 
 443 Id. at 725. 
 444 Id.  
 445  Id. at 717. 
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characterized as a “minor” encroachment on his rights.446 The 
burden borne by the plaintiffs in Parents Involved only 
implicated a child’s first choice of school, not all public 
education. Even then, any denial often lasted for only one 
school year.447 
Therefore, concerns for “racial inferiority” and “racial 
hostility,” while legitimately a consideration in Equal 
Protection jurisprudence, should be recognized as only one of 
myriad matters of fact to be analyzed in context after a full 
examination of all evidence. Chief Justice Roberts’s unfounded 
speculative concerns regarding racial hostility foreclosed the 
possibility of using a balanced approach to examine the school 
districts’ race-conscious school assignment plans in Parents 
Involved.  
C. The Balancing Test Applied to Race-Conscious Student 
Assignment Plans: Is There a Justification for a Special 
Application of Strict Scrutiny? 
We have explained above that the Equal Protection 
Clause is different from the Establishment Clause in that its 
text and history does not prohibit the Court from adopting a 
balancing test that weighs the important functions and unique 
concerns of school districts’ against its students’ constitutional 
rights. Likewise, potential hostility engendered by the limited 
use of racial classifications provides no justification for the 
Court’s fatal application of strict scrutiny. In contrast, the 
Court’s school law jurisprudence provides ample foundation for 
the adoption of a version of strict scrutiny for Equal Protection 
Clause that is fully cognizant of the special role public schools 
play in our democratic republic. In other constitutional 
contexts, the Court has balanced the concerns of school 
districts against the concerns of students to determine whether 
students receive different, or even lesser, constitutional 
protection in schools than adults do in other settings.448 Even in 
Establishment Clause cases arising in public school situations, 
the Court has engaged in a contextualized application of the 
various tests articulated to determine the boundaries of state 
action with regard to religion.449 Thus, the uniquely important 
  
 446  Id. at 725. 
 447 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 847-48 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 448  See supra Part II.A. 
 449  See supra Part II.B. 
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purpose of schools, in addition to the special relationship 
between school authorities and their students, weigh heavily in 
favor of the Court adapting adjusted constitutional standards 
as both a practical and equitable approach to analyzing school 
district policies similar to those at issue in Parents Involved. In 
this subsection, we examine race-conscious student assignment 
plans to show that a contextualized application of strict 
scrutiny would be more consistent with the Court’s collective 
education law jurisprudence. 
As noted above, strict scrutiny, as with any rights-based 
constitutional test, begins with an examination of purpose. 
Applying this analysis requires the reviewer to ascertain 
whether the goal rises to the level of a compelling state 
interest. Without reiterating the interests listed by Justice 
Breyer in detail, it seems clear that the goals served by the 
assignment plans were grounded in considerations at least as 
strong, if not stronger, than those cited in support of lowered 
constitutional standards in other rights-based contexts. 
For example, one major concern of all public school 
districts, including both Seattle and Louisville, is to improve 
the academic achievement of African American students in 
order to close identified achievement gaps.450 Federal law 
supports the importance of addressing this issue. The No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB)451 requires all students, including 
minority students, to achieve proficiency on all state standards 
for the school to attain adequate yearly progress (AYP).452 
Schools that fail to achieve AYP could be subjected to a variety 
of sanctions, ultimately including restructuring or conversion 
to charter schools.453 Integration serves as a means to help 
schools comply with NCLB. According to the National Academy 
of Education, “there is a relatively common finding [in the 
  
 450 See, e.g., School Board: District Vision, Mission, and Core Beliefs, SEATTLE 
PUB. SCH., http://www.seattleschools.org/area/board/mission.xml (last visited Nov. 10, 
2010) (“All students will achieve to their potential and the achievement gap will be 
eliminated as every student is challenged to learn at or above grade level.”); About 
JCPS, 2010-11 District Goals and Strategies, JEFFERSON CNTY. PUB. SCH., http://www. 
jefferson.k12.ky.us/About/Mission.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (“Strategic Goal 1” 
envisions that the district “will enhance teaching by engaging teachers in reflective 
practice that . . . will enable each student to attain high levels of performance and will 
facilitate the closing of achievement gaps.”). 
 451 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006). 
 452 Id. § 6311. 
 453 Id. § 6316. 
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social science research] that African American student 
achievement is enhanced by integrated schooling.”454  
Another major concern of school districts is to prepare 
students for life in a culturally pluralistic society. Because of 
the changing racial demographics in this country, schools can 
assert that it is essential to help students learn how to coexist 
with persons from other racial groups.455 According to the U.S. 
Census, minorities will become the majority of the U.S. 
population in 2042.456 In 2050, 30% of the country will be 
Hispanic, 15% of the population will be African American, and 
9.2% of the population will be Asian.457 The non-Hispanic white 
population is expected to drop from 66% in 2008 to 46% in 
2050.458 Research suggests that integrated schools help students 
cope with this new reality. According to the National Academy 
of Education, “The weight of the research evidence supports the 
conclusion that there are long-term benefits of desegregation in 
elementary and secondary schools. Under some circumstances 
and over the long term, experience in desegregated schools 
increases the likelihood of greater tolerance and better 
intergroup relations among adults of different racial groups.”459  
Note the parallels between these interests and that 
which justified the imposition of suspicionless random 
urinalysis programs in Vernonia and Earls. Both interests can 
be traced to general societal concerns—drug and alcohol use by 
students on the one hand, and enduring racial disparities in 
educational attainment on the other. Although Justice Thomas 
dismissed as “faddish”460 the robust research base that 
substantiates the benefits of integrated schooling both for 
students of color and for all students,461 neither he nor other 
  
 454 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, An Older and More Diverse 
Nation by Midcentury (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/ 
releases/archives/population/012496.html. 
 455 Brief of Amici Curiae the Council of the Great City Schools et al. 2, Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915).  
 456 Id. 
 457 Id.  
 458 Id.  
 459 NAT’L ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING 
STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 2 
(Robert L. Linn & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2007), available at http://www.naeducation. 
org/Meredith_Report.pdf.  
 460 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 780 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 461 See, e.g., Brief of the American Educational Research Association as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 5-6, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(Nos. 05-908, 05-915); Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents 4, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915). 
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members of the Court required comparable evidence that 
random urinalysis programs actually worked to lower student 
drug use. In fact, available research has yet to confirm such a 
link and some studies show either no diminution or even an 
increase in reported drug use when schools with random drug 
testing regimes are compared to similar schools without such 
requirements.462 Neither did the Court require evidence that a 
school had an actual drug problem in order to justify the 
imposition of the test in absence of individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing.463 Rather, the “custodial and tutelary” 
responsibilities of schools were sufficient to rationalize even the 
encroachment on students’ privacy interests.464 
Likewise, the school speech cases countenance relaxed 
standards based on the special role schools play in training 
children for later life. Recall that in Hazelwood, the Court 
justified the adoption of less rigorous Free Speech Clause 
protection for curriculum-related speech because of the schools’ 
role as “a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him adjust normally to his 
environment.”465 Similarly, the Bethel Court referenced the 
doctrine of in loco parentis466 and schools’ obligation to 
“inculcate the habits and manners of civility”467 when 
concluding that school officials could legitimately curtail lewd 
and indecent speech. The Court in Goss v. Lopez, too, factored 
the educational aspects of suspension as a teaching tool into its 
articulation of constitutionally required due process procedures 
  
 462 See, e.g., Linn Goldberg et al., Outcomes of a Prospective Trial of Student-
Athlete Drug Testing: The Student Athlete Testing Using Random Notification 
(SATURN) Study, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 421, 426-27 (2007). 
 463 See supra notes 276-93 and accompanying text. 
 464 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995). 
 465 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (quoting Brown I, 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 466 Justice Thomas discussed in loco parentis at length in both his concurrence 
in Morse and his dissent in Safford. In Morse, he argued that in loco parentis justifies a 
variety of actions taken with respect to student speech and concludes that Tinker 
should be overturned. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 417-18, 422 (2007) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). Likewise in Safford, he cites in loco parentis as overriding a child’s 
privacy interests even when subjected to a strip search by school officials. Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). In contrast, his opinion in Parents Involved makes no mention of the 
concept or its possible relationship to the adoption of these race-conscious intra-district 
school choice programs. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 748-52 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 467 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (quoting BEARD & 
BEARD, supra note 229, at 228). 
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for students facing discipline and the deprivation of the 
property interest of an education.468 Likewise, the Ingraham 
Court referenced the educational utility of corporal punishment 
to conclude that no notice or hearing was necessary prior to the 
imposition of the traditional sanction.469 Most recently, the 
Court in Morse permitted the disciplining of students whose 
speech school officials “reasonably regard” as promoting drug 
use, whether or not the student speaker intended such a 
message.470 In each instance, the Court paid significant 
attention to the special context of schooling and factored 
considerations of the special relationship between schools and 
students into its analysis of purpose. 
Turning to the narrow tailoring component of strict 
scrutiny, an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
commensurate with other constitutional issues in schools 
would likewise consider a number of contextual factors 
stemming from the educational environment. We frame the 
question like the Court does when analyzing Establishment 
Clause concerns. That is, would a reasonable observer, 
knowledgeable about the history and context of the student 
assignment plan under examination, conclude that the plan 
primarily works to equalize opportunity or deny opportunity on 
the basis of race? To answer this question we must consider a 
number of factors, all of which have analogs in other 
constitutional jurisprudence applied to schools. 
First, what is the history of the district’s use of race to 
determine students’ school assignments? Consideration of this 
inquiry would uncover whether the community was ever 
subject to a de jure school desegregation order. But it would 
also uncover voluntary actions taken to avoid a judicial decree 
of wrongdoing. So for example, rather than simply considering 
the judicially formalized remedial or nonremedial motivations 
as advised by the Parents Involved plurality, it would require a 
more in-depth examination of the history behind the plan—
with “calm, dispassionate reflection upon what exactly has 
been done, to whom and why.”471 As Justice Marshall observed, 
“[t]he real irony” of relying on the remedial/nonremedial 
distinction is that such judicial formalism can only be 
  
 468 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975). 
 469 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-81 (1977). 
 470 Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. 
 471 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 286, 312 (1986) (Marshall, J. 
dissenting). 
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sustained by a “complete disregard for a longstanding goal of 
civil rights reform, that of integrating schools without taking 
every school system to court.”472 Many school districts entered 
into voluntary integration plans for the express reason of 
staying out of court and avoiding the imposition of a 
“remedy.”473 As such, none of these districts acted pursuant to a 
“remedial” order as the term is used by Justice Roberts in his 
plurality decision. Yet, a thorough contextual analysis of a 
race-conscious student assignment policy needs to examine its 
entire history. So just as the history of the policy was 
important in determining that school officials overstepped 
constitutional religious boundaries in the Santa Fe case,474 the 
evolution of the policy would be dispositive in the narrow 
tailoring analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Second, a constitutionally consistent application of 
narrow tailoring would examine how choice came to be granted 
to children. If the Court had engaged in that analysis, it would 
have been clear that the privilege to choose the school a child 
would attend was intended as an inducement, a special benefit, 
in order to further voluntary integration rather than by 
“drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods.”475 In other words, the privilege 
of selecting a school was conditioned on the parents 
volunteering to permit the race of their child to be considered.476 
Students have a legitimate expectation and right to a public 
school education.477 However, they do not have a comparable 
expectation to attend a particular school. Student assignments 
are generally determined by the neighborhoods in which they 
live. Race-conscious student assignment plans do not interfere 
with a student’s right to attend public school. If a child decides 
not to participate in the plan, then he can still enroll in his 
assigned school.  
  
 472 Id. at 305. 
 473 Parents Involved, 501 U.S. 701, 805 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 474 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2000); see also 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (holding that displays of the 
Ten Commandments in a county courthouse are unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985) (invalidating an 
Alabama moment of silence statute for lack of a secular purpose). 
 475 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 476 See also Mead, supra note 430. 
 477  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1977) (holding that education is a property 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). For a 
discussion of the right to an education under state constitutions, see KERN ALEXANDER & 
M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 1082-85 (7th ed. 2009). 
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Accordingly, just as the right-versus-privilege 
distinction played an important role in the constitutionality of 
the urinalysis plans at issue in Vernonia478 and Earls,479 this 
distinction should be a consideration in the analysis of student 
assignment plans. A “conscientious objector” to random 
urinalysis faces the sacrifice of ineligibility to participate in 
extracurricular sports and clubs.480 Likewise, a conscientious 
objector to any consideration of race in student assignment 
would merely sacrifice the privilege of choice, not the right to a 
public education. 481 Therefore, the plans do not unduly intrude 
on the rights of conscientious objectors. While they may pay a 
serious price for not participating in the race-conscious 
assignment plan, those children are still able to receive a public 
school education.  
Third, a contextual application of strict scrutiny would 
carefully examine any “burden” borne by a student whose 
application for transfer was denied in relation to the purpose of 
the program. In so doing, it may be helpful once again to 
borrow a metaphor from Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
In those situations, the Court considers whether the 
“machinery of the state” has been employed to encourage or 
discourage religion.482 Likewise in an Equal Protection analysis, 
a court should examine whether the “machinery of the state” has 
been employed to advantage or disadvantage the children of one 
race. It would then become constitutionally dispositive whether 
an assignment plan “impose[s] burdens on one race alone . . . 
stigmatize[s] or exclude[s].”483 Moreover, a determination about 
whether a racial stigma has been attached to any denial of a 
choice would have to consider the parents’ role in the process of 
selection. Recall that the Supreme Court, when considering 
whether the school officials advanced religion by allowing a 
religious club to meet after instructional hours at an 
elementary school, pointed to parents as the “reasonable 
  
 478 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). 
 479 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002). 
 480 Id. at 851 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 481 This result is far less drastic than actions suggested by Justice Thomas. In 
both Morse and Safford, he argues that those unhappy with either speech or search 
policies “can seek redress in school boards or legislatures; they can send their children 
to private schools or home school them; or they can simply move.” Safford Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2656 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 482 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 347 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 483 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 799 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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observers” capable of discerning whether the school was 
endorsing religion or merely accommodating the club’s 
request.484 The Court reasoned that any coercion a child may 
have felt or any child’s misperceived endorsement of religion 
could be effectively cured by the knowledgeable parent.485 
Analogously, the knowledgeable parent would provide the same 
buffer for any child’s naïve interpretation of a choice program 
with race conscious controls in place to ensure that every child 
benefits from reasonably integrated school environments. 
Moreover, drawing again on Fourth Amendment precedent, 
just as students subjected to random urinalysis would be 
expected to learn that such restrictions on individual liberties 
were ultimately adopted “[f]or their own good and that of their 
classmates,”486 so too would parents and teachers 
knowledgeable about the history and context of the programs 
be able to help children understand that the race-conscious 
measures ultimately exist for their benefit and the benefit of 
their classmates. 
As a whole, then, consideration of all these school-based 
factors would have lead to the conclusion that the school 
assignment programs in Seattle and Louisville primarily 
worked to equalize opportunity on the basis of race. In 
addition, this contextualized review provides the mechanism by 
which to address Justice Kennedy’s call for a “principled limit” 
to the use of racial classifications.487 Moreover, since 
consideration of the school-based factors depends on context, 
and context varies from locality to locality, application of these 
factors would create a functional barrier to Kennedy’s worry 
that Congress might assert the authority to mandate 
integration programs nationally.488 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing analysis shows, it is clear that if the 
Court had applied a contextualized review consistent with its 
previous constitutional analyses in schools, then it would have 
applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the race-conscious 
student assignment plans in Parents Involved that likewise 
  
 484 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2000). 
 485 Id. 
 486 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). 
 487 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 488 Id. 
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took into full account the special function of today’s public 
elementary and secondary educational institutions. Such an 
accounting would necessarily examine the compelling nature of 
school officials’ goals to build and safeguard integrated 
learning environments. The enduring racial differences in 
achievement that motivated the racial analysis required by 
NCLB have a direct etiology in, and unbroken evolution from, 
our segregated history. As Barack Obama put it:  
Segregated schools were, and are, inferior schools; we still haven’t fixed 
them, fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, and the inferior 
education they provided, then and now, helps explain the pervasive 
achievement gap between today’s black and white students.489 
Furthermore as recognized by five members of the Parents 
Involved Court,490 integration positively impacts all students’ 
learning such that each child’s opportunities are advanced by a 
program that seeks to guarantee the benefits of integrated 
educational environments for all children, regardless of race. 
A contextualized application of strict scrutiny places no 
less emphasis on an examination of the race-conscious means, 
even when taken in furtherance of a worthy goal. Therefore, 
when examining whether the means are necessary and the use 
of race is narrowly tailored to the articulated interest, a series 
of contextual factors would need investigation. At a minimum, 
consideration should be given to: 
(a) whether facts exist to demonstrate the policy in question 
engenders feelings of “racial inferiority” by a disadvantaged group 
and whether facts link the policy to expressions of “racial hostility.”  
(b) the history of the use of race in student assignment to schools 
including, 
(1) whether the schools were ever subject to de jure 
segregation, 
(2) whether judicial findings to that end have ever been made, 
and 
(3) whether officials took voluntary action in order to avoid a 
judicial decree of wrongdoing. 
(c) whether the use of race relates to a student assignment plan or a 
student choice plan designed as an inducement to integrate; that is, 
  
 489 Barack Obama, Speech at the Constitution Center, Phila., Pa.: A More 
Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008) (emphasis added). 
 490 Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg. 
566 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
does a denial implicate the privilege to choose a particular school or 
does a denial interfere with the right to attend any school, and what 
consequence must be accepted by conscientious objectors to the policy. 
(d) whether the “machinery of the state” has been employed to 
advantage or disadvantage the children of one race, including a full 
explication of any burden borne by a child denied a preference in 
relation to the purpose of the denial.  
Given the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to broaden 
opportunity, these contextual factors should ultimately 
consider whether any race-conscious plan primarily works to 
equalize or deny opportunity on the basis of race.  
Our argument for a contextualized application of strict 
scrutiny should not be confused with a call for unfettered 
discretion on the part of school officials or unquestioning 
deference on the part of judges. We believe that, just as the 
Court’s speech, search, and due process tests have resulted in 
litigation both upholding and striking down school authority,491 
an application of strict scrutiny with full recognition of the 
variety of contextual factors associated with schools would 
likewise result in some plans being affirmed while others 
would be invalidated.  
In the end, we believe Chief Justice Warren’s framing of 
the issue in Brown applies with equal force today in relation to 
any analysis of race-conscious student selection plans: 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if 
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal 
protection of the laws.492  
Brown’s implicit assumption that eradicating de jure segregation 
would be sufficient to equalize educational opportunities 
  
 491 See, e.g., Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that due 
process rights of students were not violated by discipline for leaving school grounds to 
participate in a protest); M.A.L. ex rel. M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a school district’s policy on leaflet distribution); 
Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008) (striking down school 
officials’ discipline of students’ non-disruptive protest against student dress code); 
Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008) (striking down 
school’s video surveillance of locker room changing areas); Doran v. Contoocook Valley 
Sch. Dist., 616 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D.N.H. 2009) (upholding dog sniff search of student 
belongings); Alexander v. Underhill, 416 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Nev. 2006) (allowing due 
process challenge to go forward in relation to discipline imposed after a school fight). 
 492 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). 
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underestimated both the resistance that would follow the Court’s 
decree493 and the enduring effects of that “inherently unequal”494 
system. We believe a contextualized application of strict scrutiny 
that is vigilant but not rigid would be more consistent with the 
Court’s treatment of other constitutional issues in schools. It 
would recognize that each student enjoys a number of 
constitutionally protected freedoms but that no right is absolute, 
and that all rights must be critically examined in light of the 
context in which they seek expression. Therefore, such an 
application of strict scrutiny merely considers voluntary school 
choice programs or any race conscious effort “in the light of [their] 
full development and [their] present place”495 in today’s 
educational systems and the important role schools play in 
crafting opportunities for all children. 
  
 493 For a history of segregation and desegregation, see generally School 
Segregation, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/ 
research/deseg/deseg_gen.php?&page=1 (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
 494 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 495 Id. 
